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Web 2.0 and social media have significantly increased the amount of information 
available to users not only about firms and their offerings, but also about the activities 
of other individuals in their networks and markets. It is widely acknowledged that this 
increased availability of information is likely to influence a user’s behavior and 
choices. However, there are very few systematic studies of how such increased 
information transparency influences user behavior in emerging marketplaces. My 
dissertation seeks to examine the impact of increased information transparency – 
particularly, information about other individuals - in two emerging platforms.  The 
first essay in my dissertation compares online “social” marketing on Facebook with 
“non-social” marketing and examines their relative impacts on the likelihood of 
  
adoption, usage and diffusion of an “App”. While social marketing - wherein a user 
gets to see which of her other friends have also “liked” the product being marketed– 
is one of the fastest growing online marketing formats, there are hardly any studies 
that have examined the value of the social aspect of such marketing. I find that social 
marketing is associated with increased app adoption, usage, and diffusion as 
compared to non-social marketing. The study also uncovers interesting tradeoffs 
between the effects of different types of “social” information on user behavior 
outcomes. The second essay examines the behavior of contestants in an open 
innovation design marketplace, wherein firms seek solutions from a crowd through an 
online contest. The study examines how the availability of information about other 
contestants as well as the availability of feedback information provided to others by 
the contest holder, impacts a focal contestant’s behavior and outcomes. I find that 
contestants adopt different strategic behaviors that increase their odds of winning the 
contest under the different information-transparency regimes. The findings have 
interesting implications for the design of online contests and crowdsourcing markets. 
Overall, my dissertation provides a deeper understanding of how the visibility of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
 The ability of online markets to bring together individuals and businesses has 
transformed and redefined the ways business is conducted. In particular, the increased 
visibility of information enabled by Web 2.0 technologies has led to an explosion of 
new business models that seek to leverage this increased availability of information. 
Firms are now using information available in Web 2.0 not only for online word of 
mouth and marketing purposes, but also for tapping into the “wisdom” of the crowds. 
While prior studies have demonstrated that access to more information can lead to 
greater levels of innovation (Tjosvold & McNeely, 1988; Katz, 1982; Keller, 1986), 
there are hardly any studies of the consequences of such increased information 
transparency for individual behaviors and outcomes.  
 One type of information that has become very salient is information about 
“others” in an individual’s network or market. This sudden increase in the amount 
and variety of information available to an individual about others in her network is 
likely to have significant impact on her behaviors and choices – an issue that serves 
as the primary focus of my dissertation. My dissertation examines the impact of 
increased information transparency, and in particular information on other users in the 
community, on an individual’s behavior in two different online emerging 
marketplaces. The first essay compares and contrasts the value of “social” 
information with “non-social” information and how they impact different outcomes in 
one of the largest online social media platforms. The second essay examines the role 
of informational spillovers in open innovation design contests, in an online 




understanding of the increase of visibility of information impact on consumer 
behavior in this emerging landscape has implications for academics, policymakers, 
and entrepreneurs who seek to leverage the power of online markets.  
 The first essay in my dissertation examines a firm’s use of social media, in 
particular Facebook, as a marketing platform. Using a unique dataset from an 
established firm that sought to disseminate an App to users on Facebook, the goal of 
this essay is to understand the impact of information visibility of “others” on a focal 
users’ behavior. Unlike traditional marketing channels, Web 2.0 and social media 
allow for the visibility and dissemination of information about other individuals in a 
person’s network, “social information” that has been typically difficult or costly to 
obtain. In particular, “social marketing” seeks to leverage the availability of 
information about other users in an individual’s social network to market or advertise 
products. My first essay examines the impact of traditional non-social online 
marketing methods that contain no social information (email and ads), and social 
online marketing methods that contain social information (social ads, friend invites, 
and Facebook newsfeeds) on a focal user’s behaviors including the likelihood of 
adoption, use, and diffusion of the App.  
 I find that the visibility of “social” information is associated with greater App 
adoption, use and diffusion as compared to “non-social” information. I find that both 
the first degree as well as the second degree of friends in an individuals’ network, 
have a significant influence on her adoption behavior. I also examine the role of two 
different types of media engagement (active versus passive) and their interactions 




diffusion. I find that social information and engagement when taken together have 
interesting impacts on app use and diffusion. I also find that passive social 
information sources are better than active social information sources in fostering 
diffusion.  
 My findings are robust to a large number of alternate specifications and 
highlight the differential impacts of non-social versus social marketing methods, and 
the role of social information on user outcomes, and ultimately advertising 
effectiveness. My study takes both the marketing and information systems research a 
step forward by highlighting the significance of “social information,” and how it can 
be used with media vehicles to better drive product adoption, use, diffusion and 
ultimately sales.  
 The second essay examines the behavior of contestants in an open innovation 
marketplace with a primary focus on the role of different information visibility 
regimes on the behavior of contestants as well as contest outcomes.  Unlike 
traditional R&D efforts, where firms rely on internal firm solutions, the Internet 
enables a firm to seek solutions from a large number of people from geographically 
dispersed locations, and from a diverse set of skill sets, thereby increasing the 
potential for innovation. For example, leading organizations, such as NASA and Dell, 
have been engaging in crowdsourcing methods to successfully spark new innovations 
(McKendrick, 2012).   
 While such crowdsourcing marketplaces have been growing rapidly, there 
have been very few systematic studies of individual behaviors in these marketplaces. 




markets, where information about prior submissions in a contest and related feedback 
might be available to later participants, it is not clear how such information impacts a 
potential contestant’s behavior and outcomes. Using a dataset from one of the early 
pioneers of online crowdsourcing contests, this essay seeks to understand the role of 
different information visibility regimes on the entry behaviors of contestants and their 
likelihood of winning the contest. Contestants not only view information related to 
them, but also view information on other contestants or “others” competing with them 
in the contest.  
 Drawing on theories of design of contests (Moldovanu & Sela ,2001; Liu et al. 
,2007), time to entry (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Urban & Star, 1991; 
Reinganum, 1981) and information spillover (Brynjolffson & Hitt 2000; Chang & 
Gurbaxani, 2012; Mun & Nadiri, 2002; Cheng & Nault, 2007), I examine the 
strategies that lead to higher probability of winning under different contest designs, 
and how different types of feedback information given to prior submissions in a 
contest impacts a focal contestant’s submission behavior and ultimately her 
probability of winning the contest. I compare “open” contests possessing greater 
degrees of information transparency with “blind” contests that have limited 
information transparency, to examine how these different information regimes 
influence contestants’ choices and outcomes.  
 I find that contest design, particularly relating to information visibility, 
significantly influences contestant’s behavior as well as outcomes. Both early 
submissions as well as late submissions are more likely to win a contest compared to 




informational spillovers relating to the submissions, I find that late submissions are 
more likely to win in open contests. However, in blind contests where there are no 
informational spillovers and when no feedback is provided by the contest holder, 
there are no specific submission times that perform better than others. Only a contest 
holder’s expertise, experience, and skill are associated with her likelihood of winning 
the contest. I also find evidence of informational spillovers relating to feedback given 
to others. Interestingly, in both open as well as blind contests, when feedback is 
provided by the contest holder to contestants, we find that early submissions are more 
likely to win, particularly when these early contestants make a resubmission.  
 I also find that the benefits from informational spillovers differ depending on 
the type of feedback provided by the contest holder. In open contests with feedback, 
the more specific the feedback given to others in a contest, the higher the chances of 
late submissions winning the contest. However, in blind contests where users cannot 
see each other’s submissions, specific feedback given to other contestants does not 
benefit a focal user, while generic feedback increases the likelihood of late 
submissions winning the contest. These results highlight the importance of the role of 
different information regimes and information spillover in open innovation contests 
on time to entry and ultimately the probability winning the contest. Overall, I find that 
information spillover of certain types of visibility of information diminishes the well-
known competitive strategy of first movers, and benefits late movers when it comes 
to time to entry. 
 Overall, the two essays of my dissertation investigate the impact of increased 




online marketplaces that were enabled only through the emergence of Web 2.0. My 
dissertation contributes to the literature and practice in the following ways. 
 First, the two studies in my dissertation provide rich empirical evidence on 
how increased information transparency influences user behaviors. Essay 1 focuses 
on the role of friends – social information- in this process. Essay 2 focuses on the role 
of different information visibility regimes (different contest designs) on user behavior 
as well as contest outcomes.   
 Second, my dissertation contributes to a growing literature on diffusion of 
information, and visibility of information in online markets. The first essay highlights 
information diffusion in online social networks as a new mechanism for “social 
marketing” or “social advertising.” The second essay directly examines the role of 
diffusion of information through feedback and different contest design regimes as 
information spillover and its impact on user behavior, or the “timing of entry”. My 
dissertation shows both the benefits and the drawbacks of information transparency 
and visibility. For both academics and practitioners, understanding how consumers 
behave in these emerging landscapes is imperative. More importantly, my study sheds 
light on the overall impact of IT and Web 2.0 on not only firms, but also on user 
behavior in the context of the emerging online marketplaces. 
 Lastly, both studies foci have major implications for platform developers and 
policy makers in these emerging markets. For the first essay, my dissertation provides 
guidance to platform developers and policy makers so that they can enable and 
constrain the visibility of “social information”, and can engineer the user experience 




guidelines for crowdsourcing platforms on the design of online contests and valuable 

























Chapter 2: The Value Of “Social” Marketing: A Comparison 




With the advent of Web 2.0, consumers and their social relations have moved to the 
center of the internet stage (Mounier, 2005; Guillard, 2005). This phenomenon had 
led to a transformation of how firms engage with their customers. In particular, the 
rapid growth of social media has led to the increased use of social media platforms, 
such as Facebook, by firms for marketing their products and services. Not only are 
firms embracing social media, but a survey by the Wall Street Journal finds that 71 
percent of U.S. adults who purchase online, use consumer product reviews for their 
purchases, of which 42 percent trust such a source (Spors, 2006). More recently, an 
article illustrated that Google is trying to integrate social signals from a users’ social 
network, into their search results to "deliver more relevant results" (Lynley, 2013).   
 The most prevalent social media platform for firms is Facebook. According to 
recent estimates, over 700 billion minutes a month are spent on Facebook.
1
 As of 
2011, there are 500 million active Facebook users, half of whom log in on any given 
day. Given the popularity of Facebook among its users, it is no surprise that firms are 
increasingly seeking to target Facebook users. An important aspect of social media 
platforms such as Facebook is the social connections among users and the potential of 
such connections to influence an individual’s behavior. Firms are increasingly 
seeking to leverage such social information to tailor their marketing and advertising 
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strategies. One of the primarily mechanisms that firms use to engage with customers 
on Facebook is “Apps” or applications. Facebook Apps are highly popular with its 
users, with over 20 million Apps being installed each day. App users also tend to be 
highly engaged. Facebook Apps not only allow firms to engage users, but also enable 
them to obtain information about the user as well as her social connections and use 
this information to design their marketing strategies. However, despite the growing 
popularity of social media and the use of social information for marketing activities, 
there is very little systematic understanding of how information about “others” in an 
individual’s social network influences her behaviors. Understanding how such 
increased information transparency – in particular, about “others” in one’s social 
network - affects an individual’s behavior and choices would be valuable to both 
firms seeking to leverage these emerging technologies, as well as to technologists 
seeking to devise new tools and artifacts.  
 While prior studies have demonstrated that access to more information can 
lead to greater levels of innovation (Tjosvold & McNeely, 1988; Katz, 1982; Keller, 
1986), there are hardly any studies of the consequences of such increased information 
transparency for individual behaviors and outcomes especially in the social media 
marketplace. Firms seeking to engage consumers in social media platforms have a 
choice of two broad information provisioning strategies. Firms can continue to target 
potential consumers using traditional “non-social” formats such as display ads, email 
solicitations, or adopt emerging “social formats” such as “social ads, newsfeeds from 




social” information-provisioning formats, there is a dearth of research to guide 
decision making in this context.  
 This study is among the first to empirically examine the value of “social 
information” in comparison to “non-social” information and investigate their 
differential impacts on user outcomes as well as their implications for firms’ social 
media strategies.  In particular, this study seeks to answer the following questions. 
1) What is the impact of a users’ Facebook social network Adoption 
information on the likelihood of her App adoption? 
2) What is the impact of different information sources (for example, Social 
Information (friend invitation, newsfeed, social ad) versus Non-Social 
Information (email, Traditional online ad) on App Use and Diffusion? 
Answers to these questions will enable firms to value the effectiveness of “social 
information,” and will identify the types of information or viral product design 
features that impact product adoption, use, diffusion and ultimately advertising 
effectiveness and sales. 
 My study examines detailed data from a Facebook App that was developed by 
a leading vendor in Facebook's Preferred Developer Consultant Program. I examine 
the impact of different sources of information (social and non-social) on user 
behavior and App outcomes. I find that the type of the source of information, 
particularly relating to information about users’ friends - or social information, 
significantly influences user behavior and App outcomes.  
 I find that users’ Facebook social network adoption information impacts a 




adopting the App (both first or second degree friends) increases the likelihood of a 
user adopting the App.   
 Furthermore, I find that social information sources (friend invite, newsfeed, 
and social ad) positively impact a user’s App use and App diffusion outcomes. 
However, non-social information sources (email and traditional ads), negatively 
impact App use outcomes, and are not significant predictors of App diffusion 
outcomes.  
 I also find that the benefits from social information sources differ depending 
on the type of information engagement (active versus passive). I find that active 
sources of information (friend invite) lead to higher App use outcomes that are user 
generated (uploading stories and photos - direct) as compared to passive sources of 
information (newsfeed, social ads). Also, active social sources of information (friend 
invite) lead to higher local diffusion (outdegree) as compared to passive social 
sources (newsfeed, social ads). However, passive social sources lead to higher App 
use outcomes that are indirect (passengering planes) as compared to active social 
sources of information. More importantly, I find that passive social sources 
(newsfeed, social ads) lead to higher beyond local diffusion (diameter) as compared 
to active social sources (friend invite). This finding implies that passive social sources 
are more effective in fostering diffusion. 
 Overall, I find that the visibility of different information sources (social versus 
non-social) and the interactivity of the information (active versus passive) generates 
identifiably different social contagion effects. My results have interesting 




particular, my results show that traditional online advertising (non-social) may no 
longer be as effective, and underscore the importance of use of social information in 
online advertising. This study also sheds light on how viral products can be designed 
to generate social contagion not only by means of social information visibility but 
also by the interactivity of the information (active versus passive). These findings 
draw attention to the fact that with the increase in information visibility online, 
marketing methods should adapt to provide the right type of information to attract 
consumers. 
 My study makes a number of contributions. It is one of the first studies to 
examine the value of “social information” in the social media marketplace, and the 
consequences of differing social information. Using detailed data on different types of 
“social” and “non-social” information, my study is able to tease out the differing 
impacts of “social” and “non-social” information relating to App adoption, use and 
diffusion. Furthermore, my study is one of the first to identify the effects of the 
interactive nature of such information on App related outcomes. My study takes both 
the marketing and information systems research a step forward by highlighting the 
significance of “social information,” and how it can be used with media vehicles to 
better drive product adoption, use, diffusion and ultimately sales. More importantly, 
my study sheds light on the overall impact of IT and Web 2.0 on not only firms, but 
also on user behavior in the context of the social media marketplace, and how a 





 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 describes the research context and Section 4 describes the data and 
methodology. The results are in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the implications of my 
study and concludes. Lastly, Section 7 describes the limitations of this study and 
future research.  
2.2 Literature Review 
This study draws upon two broad streams of literature. The first relates to research on 
advertising and media engagement and its impact on user behavior. The second 
relates to social information and its impact on user behavior.  
 2.2.1 Advertising and Media Engagement 
 It is well known that given increasing ad clutter, consumers are rather 
skeptical of advertising and wary of its influence (Dahlen, 2005; Friestad & Wright, 
1995; Goodstein, 1993). The increasing ad clutter in traditional advertising media, 
such as TV and newspapers, has had negative effects on both the media and their 
advertising content. Ha and Litman (1997) find that increased advertising levels in 
magazines reduce the effectiveness of each individual ad, as well as circulation and 
profitability of the magazines. As a result, firms are constantly seeking novel ways to 
reduce this negative bias of consumers towards advertisements such as placing 
traditional ads in non-traditional environments. The idea behind certain placements is 
to blur the boundary between the advertised message and its surrounding content, 
making it more challenging for consumers to identify advertising as advertising, as it 
is made less irritating and disrupting of the content (Dahlen & Edenius, 2007). Social 




particular, the use of social information (i.e., information about an individual’s social 
network) has become a popular mechanism for firms to engage users on social media 
platforms. While prior research has largely focused on the attitude of consumers 
towards traditional ad formats, this is among the first study to compare the 
effectiveness of social ads with non-social ads. In doing so, this study contributes to 
the extant literature on advertising, particularly in the social media marketplace.  
 In addition to the sources of information (i.e., social or non-social), prior 
research has also examined how the engagement and interactivity of the information 
presented to users impacts outcomes (for instance see, Stern, 1997; Stern, 1994; 
MacInnis et al., 1991; Batra & Ray, 1983; Miniard & Cohen, 1983; Muncy & Hunt, 
1984). Ad formats differ in the range of interaction they allow. The formats may 
range from a limited click in static online banner ad, to a full range of interactive 
features in rich media ads, such as those in Macromedia’s Flash. Flash allows users to 
interact by providing search abilities, audio and video capabilities, capability to play 
games and enter contests, send e-mail and complete purchase transactions without 
ever leaving the publisher’s site. Prior work has examined two main forms of online 
media engagement or interactivity: passive advertising exposure and active 
advertising exposure (Chatterjee, 1998; Chatterjee et al., 2003). Banner ads or display 
ads are considered to be passive advertising, while targeted communications are 
considered to be a form of active advertisement exposure (Chatterjee 1998). Active 
advertisement exposure is under the consumer's control, and passive advertisement 
exposure is under the marketer's control (Chatterjee, 1998). Empirical studies 




1998; Cunningham et al., 2006; DePelsmacker et al., 2002; Feltham & Arnold, 1994; 
Gallagher et al., 2001; Nicovich, 2005; Wang, 2006; Calder et al., 2009 ) suggest that 
in general when consumers are more engaged with the advertising vehicle (active 
exposure), they are more responsive to advertising than when they are not as engaged 
(passive exposure).  
 Although there has been a strong interest in media engagement and 
advertising effectiveness, the question still remains as to what type of involvement is 
effective in social media advertising. Social media advertising not only includes 
different types of media engagement (social ads, friend invitations, newsfeed, etc.), 
but may also include social information that can impact advertising attitude 
differently. In the context of my study, I analyze behavior of users towards passive 
advertising exposure (traditional online ads, social ads, and newsfeed) and active 
advertising exposure (emails and friend invite) in the context of social media.  
2.2.2 Social Information and Social Influence 
 Individuals are likely to be affected by the opinion and behaviors of others; 
this type of influence is termed social influence (Kelman, 1958). While there is a 
large and diverse body of work related to social information and social influence, I 
review two closely related streams of research. The first being social information 
processing theory, the second focuses on how word-of-mouth (WOM) and social 
contagion (i.e., how information is diffused in social networks), impacts user 






 2.2.2.1 Social Information Processing Theory 
 According to established studies of organizational information systems, 
individual opinions of an information system are likely to be influenced by objective 
characteristics of the system, individual differences, and extent of use of the system 
(Rice & Aydin, 1991). The failure of individual attributes to sufficiently explain 
behavior, has brought theories of social influence, and more specifically, the social 
information processing model to the organizational setting (Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1978). Social information processing theory proposes that individuals may be 
influenced by cues from others about what to attend to, how to value the important 
dimensions of a phenomenon, and how others evaluate the same phenomena 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Different sources of information have different impacts 
on outcomes. Social sources of information are more likely to influence a users’ 
attitude than non-social sources of information (Rice & Aydin, 1991; Ibarra & 
Andrews, 1993; Wellman, 1983; Dean & Brass, 1985; Hartman & Johnson, 2006). 
Examining the role of social influence on consumers’ pre-purchase search efforts, 
Brown and Reingen (1987) show that information received from sources that have 
some personal knowledge about the consumer have more influence on the latter than 
sources that have no personal knowledge about the consumer.  
 My study seeks to take the social information processing theory a step forward 
by empirically analyzing how the increase in visibility of social information online 
influences user behavior in an online social media marketplace. I further analyze how 





 2.2.2.2 Social Contagion and WOM 
 Academics across several fields such as economics, marketing and sociology 
have been fascinated by the study of social interactions where individuals’ actions or 
behavior depends upon the actions or choices of other actors (Granovetter, 1973; 
Banerjee, 1992; Ellison & Fudenburg, 1993; Manski, 1993; Bala & Goyal, 1998; Van 
den Bulte & Lilien, 2001). Prior research examined the conditions under which 
consumers are likely to rely on others’ opinions to make a purchase decision (Godes 
& Mayzlin, 2004; Becker, 1991). Studies suggest that customers who were acquired 
through WOM and peer effects add more long term value to the firm than customers 
acquired through traditional marketing channels (Villanueva et al., 2008). 
Researchers have also examined the impact of WOM and peer effects on the diffusion 
of a new product (Zhang & Huang, 2011).  
 Though such social channels have influenced consumers for decades, current 
advances in technology have significantly increased the importance of consumer 
social interactions as a market force. More recently, studies have focused on targeting 
“influential” individuals who are likely to spread WOM most broadly (Katz & 
Lazersfeld, 1955; Watts & Dodds, 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2009). Biyalogorsky et 
al., (2001) use referral programs to create incentives for “influential” individuals to 
spread the word. Van der Lans et al. (2010) use observational evidence on viral 
campaigns to inform viral branching models of WOM diffusion. They define a viral 
marketing campaign as an online marketing message that stimulates consumers to 
forward the message to members of their social network. These friends are 




 While viral marketing is a very popular concept, most current work has 
focused on viral marketing campaigns for existing products, there are hardly any 
studies examining the factors that drive virality. An exception is a recent study by 
Aral & Walker (2011) who study viral product design. Viral product design consists 
of including explicit characteristics and features into a product’s design that brings 
about peer-to-peer influence to encourage adoption (Aral & Walker, 2011). Using a 
randomized experiment, Aral and Walker (2011) found that viral features 
(personalized referrals and automated broadcast notifications) generate identifiable 
and significant peer influence and social contagion effects. They also found that 
although personalized viral messages are more effective in encouraging adoption and 
are correlated with more user engagement and sustained product use, broadcast 
messaging is used more often, generating more total peer adoption in the network. 
Their findings highlight the importance of further examining how different types of 
online WOM and viral features are received by individuals.  
 There is growing evidence that social media allows firms to engage with 
customers more efficiently than do traditional marketing channels. Not only are 
consumers now better able to exchange information, but firms are also gaining the 
ability to directly initiate and manage consumer social interactions (Godes & 
Mayzlin, 2004; Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006). While advances in technology are 
creating new opportunities for firms to directly facilitate and manage consumer social 
interactions, they also impose new challenges. Distinct strategic managerial actions 




advertising and the information presented in the ad is a crucial decision that will 
impact a firm’s profitability and positioning (Chen et al., 2010). 
 Thus far, most of the empirical studies on WOM and peer effects have 
focused on observing the distribution of WOM; they do not directly observe the 
reception of WOM. In this study, I take this stream of literature ahead a step, and 
directly observe the reception of WOM by an individual’s social network. I compare 
the reception and effectiveness of online traditional non-social WOM to social WOM. 
Furthermore, I examine different types of social viral product designs and features, 
their impact on consumer behavior, and ultimately on advertising effectiveness.  
 2.2.3 Research Hypotheses 
 In this study, I examine the impact of different types of information sources 
(social versus non-social) on advertising effectiveness (App adoption, use and 
diffusion). I also explore the information engagement type (active and passive 
media), and how the engagement interacts with the type of information source to 
impact outcomes of interest.  
 Figure 2.3 shows the different categories I examine in this study.  In 
particular, I examine social versus non-social sources of information; and active 
versus passive information engagements. Social sources are sources that provide 
information related to friends (social ads, newsfeed and friend invite). Non-social 
sources do not include such friend related information (emails and traditional ads). As 
for the engagement of the source, I use Chatterjee’s (1998) definition of active versus 
passive media engagement. Traditional ads, social ads (similar to banner ads) are 




pop-up in a user’s Facebook newsfeed page, and are under the marketers’ control, 
making them passive. On the other hand, emails and friend invites require a higher 
level of interaction by actually clicking on the email or invite, and thus are considered 
active engagements.   
 According to social influence theories and social information, individuals are 
influenced by social sources of information as they are perceived to be more 
trustworthy. I therefore propose that advertising with social information as compared 
to non-social information formats, influences consumers’ attitudes more positively 
towards the advertised message as measured by her adoption, use and diffusion: 
Proposition 1: Ad effectiveness (adoption, use and diffusion) is higher when social 
information is presented in an ad compared with the non-presentation of social 
information.  
 The concept of an active advertisement is a feature that differentiates Web 
advertising from advertising in traditional media. My study examines the two types of 
online advertising by comparing active advertising (emails, friend invite) and passive 
advertising (newsfeed, social ad, and traditional ads). Although studies have shown 
that media engagement improves advertising effectiveness, I argue that media 
engagement will not be effective under traditional non-social advertising; however, 
media engagement will be effective when social information is presented. Given that 
active information sources are under the consumer’s control and have more media 
engagement as compared to passive information sources, I argue that active 
information sources will lead to higher effectiveness (use and diffusion) than passive 




Proposition 2: Media Engagement (active versus passive) of an ad will lead to 
higher advertising effectiveness when coupled with social information as compared to 
no social information. In particular, active information sources will lead to 
higher advertising effectiveness than passive information sources in the presence of 
social information.  
 Overall, my study will contribute to an emerging area of research, namely the 
use and influence of online social and non-social information sources on consumers’ 
decision-making processes. My study adds to the above mentioned streams of 
literature by examining how different sources of information (social versus non-
social), and how different types of engagement (active versus passive) impacts user 
adoption, use, and diffusion in the social media marketplace. My study will also 
contribute to the WOM literature by providing empirical evidence on the reception 
and advertising effectiveness of different types of online WOM. 
2.3 Research Context 
I use App-related data that was developed by a leading vendor in Facebook's 
Preferred Developer Consultant Program. The App was launched at the end of March 
2011, and was active till the middle of May 2011, for a period of around 6 weeks. The 
developer firm had the following channels to advertise the App: (a) Email, (b) 
Traditional online display ads, (c) Social ads – traditional online display ads that 
includes “Friends also Liked” button (see Figure 2.2), and (d) Other- users that 
adopted the App directly and not via online advertising. Lastly, given that the App 




Newsfeed, and (f) others adopted the App as a result of a direct invitation on 
Facebook from their friends.   
 The App used for this study is a game that consists of the following steps: 
First, a user “Like”-s the App. Second, the user gets to “pilot” a plane and invites 5 
friends to “passenger” the plane. If all the friends accept, then the user is enrolled in 
the sweepstakes. The sweepstakes reward is a free ticket for the user and his 5 friends 
to go on a vacation. Users can become unlimited number of passengers, but can pilot 
a maximum of only 15 planes.  Also, users are encouraged throughout the App 
lifetime to share stories and photos. Such activity will enroll them into another 
sweepstakes to win around $200.  
 Emails promoting the App were sent out in 3 periods: (a) early April, (b) mid-
April, and (c) early-May. Prior to mid-April, the ads were all regular (non-social) 
display ads. Social ads only came into use after mid-April, creating a setting for a 
natural experiment that I use in this study. I collected data on App adoption, use and 
diffusion, along with Facebook related data of the users and their friends.  
2.4 Data and Methodology 
The data was compiled from various sources. Below, I describe the sample 
construction method and then provide the details of the empirical models and 
estimation methods. 
 2.4.1 Sample Construction 
 The vendor had collected data on users that “Like”-d the App which consists 




which I used to collect Facebook related data (I refer to this sample as the Outcome 
sample, henceforth). Table 2.1 shows the frequency distribution for the source of 
adoption of the users. Traditional online ads produced 31 percent of the sample, and 
social ads and email constitute 5 percent of the sample. Nearly 8 percent were invited 
by their friends, whereas approximately 30 percent came from Facebook newsfeeds. 
Table 2.2 shows further descriptive statistics, including the average App use and 
users’ Facebook activity and some social network related metrics. On average, users 
have 15 Facebook “Like”-s, and around 300 Facebook friends.  
 As for users that saw the App but did not “Like” or adopt the App, I was able 
to obtain two sub-samples of such users. The first sub-sample consists of users that 
were “Fans” of the Vendors Facebook Page. These users were able to see the App, 
but some did not adopt or “Like” the App. I extracted users that were active fans 
starting 3 months prior start date of the App (from Dec 2010) up to the end of the App 
duration in May 2011. This sub-sample (henceforth, “FanPage”) consisted of a total 
of 5,208 users of whom 3,914 users did not like the App. I constructed the second 
sub-sample (henceforth, “Top10CC”) using the top 10 connected components
2
 from 
the users that had “Like”-d the App (287 distinct users), and I collected their first 
degree Facebook friends network (103,493 distinct friends). These friends would 
have seen the App on the Facebook newsfeed through their friends that had “Like”-d 
the App. Of these 103,493 friends, 1,174 “Like”-d the App, and the rest did not. I 
then constructed the friendship network using day and time of adoption of the App. 
                                                 
2
 A connected component is basically a connected sub-graph of a graph to which no vertex can be 
added and still be connected. More formally, given a graph (G) with vertices (V) and edges (E) such 
that G= (V, E), a sub-graph S= (V’, E’) is a connected component if (a) S is connected, and (b) for all 





Table 2.3 shows the adoption distribution of this sub-sample. I find that 58 percent of 
the Top10CC users had only first degree friends liking the App, 11 percent had only 
second degree friends liking the App, and 31 percent had both first and second degree 
friends liking the App. The third, and more robust, sample (henceforth, 
“Intersection”) is the intersection of the two sub-samples, which was composed of 
387 users that saw the App but did not “Like” the App.  
 The number of users that “Like”-d the App and had Facebook URLs is 
173,050 (outcome sample). The sub-samples, FanPage and Intersection, are much 
smaller in terms of the number of users that did not “Like” the App (3,914 and 387 
respectively). Therefore, I used a random matched sample from the outcome sample 
of similar size for estimation (3,000 and 400 respectively) to generate a more 
balanced sample for estimation. The Top10CC sample was large enough (102,606) to 
include the whole outcome sample (173,050). Table 2.4 summarizes the sample 
constructions.  
 2.4.2 Empirical Model 
 I examine user behavior outcomes in terms of App adoption, use and diffusion 
as a function of the visibility of social information. I only observe App use and 
diffusion for users that “Like”-d the App. Thus, to draw conclusions about the larger 
population of all users that saw the App, not just the subpopulation of users that 
“Liked” the App, the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation procedure for a 
continuous decision variable can be used to incorporate the App use and diffusion 




adopt and use/diffuse are made simultaneously (that is, the error terms of the two 
equations are correlated).   
 The first step is the selection equation, which is estimated by maximum 
likelihood as an independent Probit model to determine the decision to adopt using 
information from the whole sample of adopters and non-adopters. A vector of inverse 
Mills ratios (estimated expected error) is generated from the parameter estimates 
(Greene, 1993).   
 App use and diffusion -- which is observed only when the selection equation 
equals 1 (that is, a user adopts the App) -- is then regressed on the explanatory 
variables, and the vector of inverse Mills ratios from the selection equation using 
ordinary least squares. Therefore, the second stage reruns the regression with the 
estimated expected error included as an extra explanatory variable, removing the part 
of the error term correlated with the explanatory variable and avoiding the selection 
bias.   
 I estimate a two-stage Heckman (1979) model where the first stage accounts 
for the selection (that is, a user’s probability of adopting the App). The second stage 
examines the outcomes of interest (for users that have adopted the App) -- App use 
and App diffusion -- as a function of the source of adoption.   
 Selection Stage: 
zi* = i  + u i               ( zi = 1 if  zi* > 0 ; zi = 0 if  zi* <=  0 ) 
 Outcome Stage: 
yi = xi  + I   if zi* > 0 




 zi* identifies whether or not the user i “Like”-d the App or more formally 
adopted the App. The selection covariates that impact a user i’s App adoption are 
termed i. The outcome covariates that impact a user i’s App use and App diffusion 
are termed xi ; yi  and are the outcomes of interest for user i, namely, App use and App 
diffusion.  
 The Heckman model can be identified either through non-linearity intrinsic to 
selection models (for example, Uzzi, (1999)), or through exclusion restrictions. I 
consider exclusion restrictions, and use MediaExposure (days when the App received 
media exposure through Regis and Kelly’s advertisement, New York Times,other 
emails that were sent out to advertise for the App, and introduction time of social ads) 
which increased traffic to the App and thereby adoption of the App. Yet, 
MediaExposure is not correlated with App use and diffusion as such metrics are post 
adoption. Therefore, for a user i, it will take some time from her MediaExposure, to 
actually use and diffuse the App. Empirically, this variable has an F-statistic 
exceeding 47, which is well above the cutoff point for a strong instrument, namely 
10, as suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).  
 2.4.3 Estimation 
 My study examines (a) App adoption, (b) App use, and (c) App diffusion as a 
function of the visibility of social information sources. Table 2.5 describes the 
variables and their description in detail. Below I describe the estimation method for 






 2.2.3.1 App Adoption 
 In the App adoption stage, the outcome of interest is a binary variable as to 
whether or not the user adopted the App. To examine the impact of a users’ Facebook 
social network adoption information on the likelihood of her App adoption, I 
investigate the social exposure of a user to the App in terms of her friends’ adoption 
of the App. In particular, Social Exposure to App, entails the percentage of Facebook 
first degree and second degree friends that adopted the App at the time of user 
adoption decision. I control for user (a) Demographic information: gender and 
location, (b) Facebook Privacy Settings
3
 (for example, “Add as Friend” button and 
“Send Message Button”), (c) Facebook Activity: Facebook “Like”-s and activities. In 
particular, the probability of a user i’s App adoption is the first stage of the Heckman 
model: 
P (App Adoptioni) = f (Social Exposure to Appi, Demographici, Facebook Privacy 
Settingsi, Facebook Activityi) + i                                Equation (2.1) 
 To further control for possibility of omitted variable bias, I use Cox 
proportional hazard model with gamma frailty (Newman & McCullogh, 1984). This 
is a standard technique for assessing contagion in economics, marketing, IS, and 
sociology (Van den Bulte & Lilien, 2001; Iyengar et al., 2011; Aral & Walker, 2011; 
Nam et al., 2010). I estimate the Hazard of adoption for individual i at time t (time of 
adoption) as a function of individual characteristics and social influence: 
    h(t|x) = h0(t)exp(x)        Equation (2.2) 
                                                 
3
 What I term Facebook Privacy Settings in this study is not actual Facebook Privacy settings. It is a 
measure of enabling and disabling certain buttons that might be indicative to privacy e.g. “Add as 




 where h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate, x is a vector of covariates that impact 
the App adoption decision (both related and unrelated to social influence as in 
Equation 2.1), and  is the  hazard ratio which is the exponentiated form of the 
coefficient . To ensure vigor of results, I use all three samples (FanPage, Top10CC, 
Intersection) in estimating the likelihood of App adoption for user i. 
 2.2.3.2 App Use 
 Once users have adopted or “Like”-d an App, they can then use the App by 
becoming passengers of planes, uploading stories and uploading photos. Thus, the 
dependent variables for App use are (a) Log(Passenger count), (b) Log(Stories count), 
and (c) Log(Photos count)
4
. The main independent variable of interest is the visibility 
of social information in terms of the source of adoption. There are five main sources 
of adoption: email, regular online ads (traditional non-social information sources), 
friend invitations, Facebook newsfeed, and social ads (social information sources). I 
control for (a) Demographic information: gender and location,  (b) Facebook Privacy 
Settings, (c) App Network : number of friends that like the App at time of adoption, 
number of invitations sent by user and accepted by friend, (d) Facebook Activity : 
Facebook “Like”-s and Facebook activity, total number of Facebook friends, (e) App 
Adoption Rate: day of adoption, Threshold lag, percentage of Facebook friend 
adopters, and (f) Friend App usage: average pilot count of friends, average passenger 
count of friends, average photo count of friends, and average story count of friends. 
                                                 
4
 While uploading stories and photos are user generated and considered direct App use, passengering is 




To examine the impact of visibility of social information sources of adoption 
on App use for user i, I estimate the second stage of the Heckman model with 
logarithmic App use outcome variables,  
Log (App Usei) = f (Adoption Sourcei, App Networki, Demographici, Facebook 
Privacy Settingsi, Facebook Activityi, App Adoption Ratei, Friend App Usei) + εi   
                   Equation (2.3)  
 2.2.3.3 App Diffusion 
 Once users have adopted or “Like”-d an App, they can not only use the App, 
but also send out invitations to their friends to join the App -- diffuse the App. I 
explore App diffusion outcomes on two main measures: (a) Diameter (maximum 
diffusion depth) and (b) Outdegree of a user. The extent to which the effect of the 
adoption source leads to adoption beyond a user’s immediate local network is 
measured by the maximal diffusion depth (diameter) – the maximum network 
distance from a user to any peer adopter in a linked chain of adoptions. This is a 
measure of the breadth or reach of a user’s network. The extent to which the effect of 
the adoption source leads to adoption in a user’s immediate local network is measured 
by the outdegree of a user – number of invitations that were sent by the user and 
accepted by her friends. This is a measure of the width of a user's local network.  
 To examine the impact of visibility of social information sources of adoption 
on App diffusion, I use the same set explanatory and control variables as for the App 
use outcome. However, one concern is the argument that users that use the App more 
may be more likely to diffuse the App. Following Villas-Boas and Winer (1999), I 




total App use of a user is measured at time t whereas diffusion metrics are measured 
at time t+1, such that the total App activity of a user came before the friend’s 
acceptance of the invitation. I estimate the second stage of the Heckman model with 
logarithmic App diffusion outcome variables,  
Log(App Diffusioni(t+1))
 5
 = f (Adoption Sourcei, Total App Usei (t), App Networki, 
Friend App Use i (t), Demographici, Facebook Activityi, App Adoption Ratei)+ εi            
         Equation (2.4) 
2.5 Results 
Table 2.6a provides the estimation results for the App adoption outcome. Table 2.6b 
displays the regression results of the App use outcomes, and Table 2.6c displays the 
results of the App diffusion model. The key research objective is to investigate the 
role of visibility of social information to users on App outcomes. I start by examining 
regression coefficients of the App adoption outcome, followed by App use outcomes, 
and lastly App diffusion outcomes. In particular, I refer to the regression coefficients 
of the Heckman model using the Intersection sample (since it is the most robust 
sample, and the Heckman model is most appropriate for my data). All samples and 
models provide consistent results in terms of sign and significance.  
2.5.1 App Adoption  
 Table 2.6.a reports the likelihood of adoption estimates using both Heckman 
selection estimation method, and Cox proportional model with gamma frailty for all 
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 Lagging avoids endogeneity problems unless (a) people are forward looking not only about their own 
behavior but also (b) on the behavior of others’ social ties, over which influence flows are symmetric 
(Lyengar et al., 2011). The first condition is quite unlikely in large networks as Facebook, and the 
second condition does not hold in my data as the Like invitation ties are directed ties, and I control for 




three samples. As for the Cox model, I report the exponentiated form of the 
coefficient, which is called the hazards ratio. A hazards ratio greater than 1.0 for 
variable x indicates that it increases the probability of App adoption, while a ratio less 
than 1.0 indicates that it decreases the probability of App adoption. 
 Column 1 of Table 2.6a reports results of the first stage Heckman model and 
column 2 reports results of the Hazard model for the FanPage sample. Columns 3 and 
4 report the estimation results of the first stage Heckman and Hazard model for the 
Top10CC sample respectively. Columns 5 and 6 report the estimation results of the 
first stage Heckman and Hazard model of the more robust Intersection sample. 
 Referring to the column 5 of Table 2.6a, I find that the coefficient on 
FirstDeg_FrndAdop is positive and significant (FirstDeg_FrndAdop= 0.4731), indicating 
that higher number of first degree friends adopting the App (at time of adoption 
decision of user i), the greater the likelihood of focal user i’s adoption. Furthermore, 
the coefficient on SecondDeg_FrndAdop is also positive and significant 
(SecondDeg_FrndAdop= 0.1047), implying that higher number of second degree friends 
adopting the App (at time of adoption decision of user i), the greater the likelihood of 
focal user i’s adoption. The coefficient on the interaction of the first and second 
degree friends is positive and significant (FirstDeg*SecondDeg = 0.5027), implying that 
having higher number of first and second degree friends adopting the App (at time of 
adoption decision of user i), the greater the likelihood of focal user i’s adoption. 
Overall, these findings suggest that social exposure of a user to the App in terms of 
her friends’ adoption information of the App has a positive and significant impact on 




interestingly, this is the case not only for the exposure of first degree friends’ 
adoption information, but also for the exposure of second degree friends’ adoption 
information. 
 In terms of economic interpretations, a one unit increase in social information 
on the number of first degree friends adopting results in 17.03% increase in the 
probability of a user adopting as indicated by the average marginal effect. A one unit 
increase in social information on the second degree friends adopting results in 3.87% 
increase in the probability of the user adopting as indicated by the average marginal 
effect. A one unit increase in social information on the number of first and second 
degree friends adopting results in 18.10% increase in the probability of the user 
adopting as indicated by the average marginal effect. My findings support Proposition 
1a that advertising effectiveness in terms of adoption is higher when there is social 
information in the advertising medium rather than when there is no social information 
in the advertising medium.  
 Results for the control variables align well with expectations. The coefficient 
for Female is positive and significant, indicating that on average females are more 
likely to adopt than males. This finding is not surprising; as noted by the vendor that 
develops Facebook Apps on average for most Facebook Apps, females are 
predominant. The coefficient for likes_count is positive and significant, implying that 
users that have a higher number of Facebook Likes have a higher probability of App 
adoption. This is in accordance with what one would expect. Users that have a high 




2.5.2 App Use 
 Table 2.6.b reports the second stage of the Heckman regression model for the 
App use outcomes (a) Log Passenger count, (b) Log Stories count, and (c) Log Photos 
count. Columns 1-3 of Table 2.6b report the estimation results for the FanPage 
sample. Columns 4-6 report the estimation results for the Top10CC sample. Lastly, 
columns 7-9 report the estimation results for the more robust Intersection sample. 
Estimation results from all three samples are similar in terms of sign and significance.  
 Referring to columns 7-9 in Table 2.6b, the signs of the coefficients reported 
for the social and non-social sources of adoption variables are in accordance with 
what one would expect as compared to the baseline. The regression coefficients for 
non-social sources are negative and significant (Passengering: source_ad = -0.0109, 
source_email = -0.1251; Stories: source_ad = -0.1607, source_email =-0.0313; Photos: 
source_ad =-0.1363, source_email = -0.0081), implying that non-social sources of 
information have a negative impact on App use. Whereas, the regression coefficients 
for social sources are positive and significant (Passengering: source_invited = 0.2449, 
source_nf = 0.4224, source_socialad =0.3196; Stories: source_invited = 0.2561, source_nf = 
0.1228, source_socialad = 0.1015; Photos: source_invited = 0.2079, source_nf = 0.1375, 
source_socialad = 0.0729), indicating that social sources of information have a positive 
impact on a users’ App use. These findings support Proposition 1 that effectiveness of 
the information, as measured by App use, is higher when social information is 
presented in the ad as compared to when no social information is presented.  
 More interestingly, while the regression coefficients of social sources 




These findings indicate that media engagement is effective under social sources of 
information supporting Proposition 2 for App use. To further analyze how social 
information interacts with media engagement to impact App use, I examine the effect 
sizes of the different types of engagement (active versus passive) regression 
coefficients on App use outcomes.  
 For user generated content (stories and photos) App use outcomes, the 
regression coefficients of active social sources (friend invite) rank higher (Stories: 
source_invited = 0.2561; Photos: source_invited = 0.2079) than the regression coefficients of 
passive social sources ( newsfeed and social ads - Stories: source_nf = 0.1228, 
source_socialad = 0.1015; Photos: source_nf = 0.1375, source_socialad = 0.0729), implying that 
active social sources are more effective than passive social sources when it comes to 
direct App use of a user (for example, user generated content). Similarly, the 
regression coefficients of active non-social sources (email) on user generated content 
App use outcomes, although negative, have a less negative impact than passive non-
social sources (traditional ad). As for passengering App use outcome, the regression 
coefficients of passive social sources (source_nf = 0.4224; source_socialad =0.3196) rank 
higher than the regression coefficients of active social sources (source_invited = 0.3196), 
indicating that passive social sources are more effective towards the App use of the 
overall system rather than to the user herself (for example, more passengers on 
planes). Non-social sources, although estimates are negative, also show a less 
negative impact on passive sources than active sources for passengering App use 




direct App use (supporting proposition 2); passive social sources are more effective in 
indirect App use.  
 I also find several interesting controls to be significant, particularly relating to 
user gender, adoption time, Facebook “Like”-s and activities, Facebook privacy 
settings, and friend adoption information.  
 As for gender, parallel to the intuition that females tend to use Apps more than 
males, the coefficient for Female is positive on all App use outcomes, implying that 
females are associated with higher App use as compared to men. In terms of adoption 
time, I find that users that adopted earlier have a higher App activity (day_lvl_adop), 
largely because they had more time to use the App.  
 I also find a users’ Facebook “Like”-s and activities to be significant. The 
coefficient likes_count is positive, implying that the higher the total Facebook “Like”-
s the higher the App use. This finding is consistent with the notion that Facebook 
“Like”-s can be considered as a measure of Facebook activity; and the more the user 
is active on Facebook, the higher the App activity. Furthermore, certain specific 
“Like” categories on Facebook have significant impacts as well (for example, 
fbc_interests, fbc_activities).  
 With regards to Facebook privacy settings, the coefficient (ln_ttl_privacy) is 
positive on the passengering outcome (an indirect use); and negative on the stories 
and photos outcomes (user generated content – direct use). This finding denotes that 
the higher the privacy settings of a user, the higher the passengering activity; yet the 
more public the higher the users’ activity in writing stories or posting photos. This 




would only be passengers (a type of App use that does not present information about 
the user). Less private users, that don’t mind their information going public, would 
post stories and pictures.  
 Lastly, in terms of friend adoption information, the coefficients 
FirstDeg_FrndAdop and SecDeg_FrndAdop are both positive and significant, 
showing that the number of friends that have “Like”-d the App at time of adoption, 
being first or second degree friends, is positively associated with App use. Yet the 
actual total number of Facebook friends (num_ofFB_friends) although the estimate is 
significant, has a coefficient of 0, meaning that the number of Facebook friends does 
not really impact App use. On a similar tone, the negative and significant coefficients 
on threshold_percFriendAdop show that the smaller the lag between the last friend 
that adopted and a users’ adoption time, the higher the App use.  
2.5.3 App Diffusion  
 Table 2.6c reports the second stage of the Heckman regression model for the 
App diffusion outcomes (a) Log Diameter, and (b) Log Outdegree. Columns 1 and 2 
of Table 2.6c report the estimation results for the FanPage sample. Columns 3 and 4 
report the estimation results for the Top10CC sample. Lastly, columns 5 and 6 report 
the estimation results for the more robust Intersection sample.  
 The signs and significance of the coefficients from the three samples are 
consistent, particularly the source of adoption estimates relative to the baseline. 
Referring to columns 5 and 6 in Table 2.6c, the estimation coefficients reported for 
source_invited, source_nf and source_socialad are positive and significant, implying 




Interestingly, non-social sources - source_ad and source_email - are not significant 
predictors of App diffusion as compared to the baseline. Taken together, these 
findings support Proposition 1 for App diffusion.  
 Once again, the findings that media engagement has no significant impact on 
App diffusion when information sources are non-social; and that the regression 
coefficients of social source variables are positive and significant, indicate that media 
engagement is effective under social sources of information supporting Proposition 2 
for App diffusion. To further analyze how social information interacts with media 
engagement to impact App diffusion, I examine the effect sizes of the different 
engagement (active versus passive) regression coefficients on App diffusion 
outcomes. 
 In examining diffusion with respect to the depth of the network (diameter), the 
coefficients on passive social sources of information (source_nf = 0.3339; source_socialad 
= 0.2369) rank higher than the coefficients on active social sources of information 
(source_invited = 0.1725), implying that passive social sources of information are more 
effective than active social sources of information when it comes to diffusion. On the 
other hand, in examining diffusion with respect to the width of the network reach 
(outdegree) or local diffusion, the coefficients on active social sources of information 
(source_invited = 0.4673) rank higher than the coefficients on passive social sources of 
information (source_nf = 0.1588; source_socialad = 0.0496), indicating that that active 
social sources of information are more effective than passive social sources of 
information when it comes to local diffusion. These findings are consistent and 




are more effective than passive social sources when it comes to direct user impact (for 
example, local diffusion), supporting proposition 2. However, passive social sources 
are more effective towards the overall system (for example, beyond local diffusion). 
 I also find several interesting controls to be significant, particularly relating to 
user gender, adoption time, Facebook “Like”-s and activities, Facebook privacy 
settings, and friend adoption information.  
 As for gender, I find that the coefficient on Female is positive, indicating that 
on average females are associated with higher App diffusion as compared to males. 
Again this is in line with the reasoning that females tend to use Apps more than 
males. As for time of adoption, I find that users that adopted earlier have a higher 
App diffusion (day_lvl_adop), which is reasonable since they had more time to send 
out invitations to friends. I also find that certain specific “Like” categories on 
Facebook have significant impacts as well (for example, fbc_interests, 
fbc_fav_athletes), highlighting the fact that Facebook activities can be a good 
predictor of App diffusion.   
 In terms of Facebook privacy settings, the coefficient on ln_ttl_privacy is 
negative for both App diffusion outcomes, showing that the lower the privacy of the 
user the higher the App diffusion. This result is in line with the fact that users who are 
private may not want to share the App and send invitations.  
 With regards to friend adoption information, the coefficient 
FirstDeg_FrndAdop and SecDeg_FrndAdop are both positive and significant, 
showing that the number of friends that have “Like”-d the App at time of adoption, 




outcomes. The coefficient on num_ofFB_friends although significant is 0, denoting 
that the number of Facebook friends does not have any real impact on App diffusion.  
2.5.4 Robustness Checks 
 To ensure the robustness of my findings, I conducted a series of additional 
tests. In this section, I present different robustness checks that address potential 
concerns relating to endogeneity, homophily versus social influence, and sample 
representativeness.  
 2.5.4.1 Potential Endogeneity 
 The higher the user’s App use, the more likely is the user to send out 
invitations, resulting in higher diffusion. Therefore, App use may be correlated with 
some unobservable user-specific characteristics that might influence App diffusion. 
To control for this potential problem, I use a Two Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) 
regression with IV. Under the 2SLS approach, in the first stage, each endogenous 
variable is regressed on all valid instruments, including the full set of exogenous 
variables in the main regression. Since the instruments are exogenous, these 
approximations of the endogenous covariates will not be correlated with the error 
term. In the second stage, each endogenous covariate is replaced with its 
approximation estimated in the first stage and the regression is estimated as usual. 
The slope estimator thus obtained is consistent (Wooldridge, 2001). The intuition 
behind the use of IV’s is that they are likely to be correlated with the relevant 
independent variables but uncorrelated with unobservable characteristics that may 
influence the dependent variable. In particular, a valid IV for App use will be 




 I instrument for total App use with Facebook “Like”-s count, which was 
highly significant in predicting App use outcomes. In theory a user that has more 
“Like”-s on Facebook (a type of Facebook activity) will be more likely to be active 
on Apps. Although Facebook Likes Count might impact her App use behavior, it is 
unlikely to impact App diffusion, as sending out invitations and having friends 
accepting them is an act beyond one’s direct Facebook “Like”-ing activity. In terms 
of statistical correlation, I find that users Facebook Likes Count is -0.2147 correlated 
with total App use, and 0.0001 with diameter diffusion outcome, and -0.0235 with the 
outdegree diffusion outcome. I conduct a 2SLS regression, where I instrument for 
total App use in the first stage by using a user’s Facebook Likes Count as an IV. 
Moreover, the total App use of a user is measured at time t whereas diffusion metrics 
are measured at time t+1, such that the total App activity of a user came before the 
friend’s acceptance of the invitation. Table 2.7 shows the regression estimates of the 
2SLS model for App diffusion outcomes. The first-stage F statistic for both App 
diffusion outcomes is highly significant and much higher than the minimum value of 
10, alleviating weak instrument concerns (Staiger & Stock, 1997). More importantly, 
the regression coefficients in Table 2.7 for both types of App diffusion outcomes are 
consistent with my results in terms of sign and significance.  
 2.5.4.2 Homophily versus Social Influence 
 To distinguish homophily driven diffusion from social influence, several 
approaches for identifying peer effects have been proposed, including peer effects 
models and extended spatial autoregressive models (Kelejian & Prucha,1998; 




2009), actor-oriented models (for example, Snijders et al., 2007), dynamic matched 
sample estimation (Aral et al., 2009), structural models (for example, Ghose & Han, 
2010), and ad hoc approaches (Christakis & Fowler, 2007).  Natural experiments are 
by far the best approach (for example, Sacerdote, 2001; Tucker, 2008). Therefore, to 
distinguish homophily driven diffusion from social influence, I analyze data from a 
natural experiment, on the move from traditional ads to social ads.  
 Initially, only traditional ads were presented to users; however, after mid-
April, social ads were introduced. In particular, after mid-April, if a user had friends 
that “Like”-d the App, the user was presented with a social ad as opposed to a 
traditional ad. However, after mid-April, if a user had no friends that had “Like”-d the 
App, then the user was presented with a traditional ad. In sum, before mid-April only 
traditional ads were presented to users regardless of whether or not they had friends 
that “Like”-d the App; after mid-April social ads were presented if users had friends 
that “Like”-d the App. Table 2.8 shows the frequency distribution of the four 
categories of the before social ads and after social ads groups ((1)Before Social Ads 
& Friends “Like”-d (2) Before Social Ads & No Friends “Like”-d (3) After Social 
Ads & Friends “Like”-d (4) After Social Ads & No Friends “Like”-d ). Table 2.9 
shows the averages and paired two sample t-tests of the before and after groups to 
ensure that groups are not inherently different. Both averages and t-tests show that 
there is no significant difference between the before and after groups. 
 To examine the impact of traditional non-social ads versus social ads on App 
use and App diffusion, I conduct an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for App 




OLS regressions results of users that adopted through the various groups of ads on 
App use outcomes ((a) Log(Passenger), (b)Log(Stories), and (c)Log(Photos)).  Table 
2.10b reports 2SLS regression model for App diffusion outcomes ((a) Log(Diameter) 
and (b) Log(Outdegree)) using Facebook Likes count as an IV for total App use; the 
total App use is also lagged one period to control for potential endogeneity.  
 The regression coefficients of social ads are all positive and significant for 
both App use and App diffusion outcomes. These estimates imply that users that 
come from social ads are associated with higher App use and App diffusion as 
compared to users that came from traditional ads and had friends that liked the App. 
The coefficients for before_nofriendsliked- Traditional Ad are negative and 
significant for both App use and App diffusion outcomes. This finding indicates that 
users that came through a traditional ad with no friends that “Like”-d the App are 
negatively associated with App use and App diffusion as compared to users that came 
through a traditional ad with friends that liked the App. Lastly, I find no significant 
difference between the before and after users that came from traditional ads and had 
no friends that liked the App for both App use and App diffusion outcomes. Overall, 
these results show that the App use and App diffusion of a user is impacted by the 
knowledge that their friends “Like” the App at time of adoption, highlighting the role 
of visibility of social information.  
 2.5.4.3 Representative Sample 
 Selection effects could occur when users in the study sample are not 
representative of the overall Facebook population. Obtaining official demographic 




Facebook does not publish such information. I therefore use recently released 
statistics on Facebook demographics by socialbakers.com and istrategylabs.com, both 
being social targeting advertisement services that have a focus on Facebook. Figures 
2.4a and 2.4b show the overall comparison of my study sample to the Facebook 
population. Specifically, Figure 2.4a displays the geographic distribution and Figure 
2.4b displays the gender distribution. In general, I find that although my sample has a 
slightly higher percentage of women and of users on the American continent than the 
Facebook population, the demographics of my study population are comparable to 
those of the broader Facebook population. Also, the published Facebook 
demographics fall within less than two standard deviations of my study sample 
means.  
 2.5.4.4 Additional Specifications 
 I also estimated several alternative model specifications. Using all three 
samples, I ran a Probit and a Logit model for predicting App adoption (Equation 2.1). 
I further looked at Probit with IV by using the MediaExposure variable as an 
instrumental variable. All the three alternative models provided highly consistent 
results in terms of sign and significance. 
 App use and App diffusion outcomes are count data and might have a 
distribution that is similar to the Poisson distribution. I therefore ran Poisson 
regression models for App use and App diffusion (Equations 2.3 and 2.4 
respectively), on all three samples. Regression coefficients are highly consistent with 
my findings in terms of sign and significance. Furthermore, since the App use and 




users (there might be over-dispersion of zeros in the data), thus a negative binomial 
model might also be appropriate. I estimated a negative binomial regression model 
for App use and App diffusion on all three samples. I obtained consistent findings in 
terms of sign and significance of the estimates of interest.    
2.6 Conclusions and Implications 
Advances in Web 2.0 technologies have significantly transformed the way in which 
firms interact and market to their consumers. Most noticeably, there has been a 
significant growth in the number of firms using social media advertising, and, in 
particular, Facebook as a main platform to target their marketing efforts. Such social 
media advertising mechanisms provide and make visible information on what 
“others” in a consumer’s social network are doing. Prior to Web 2.0, such “social” 
information was difficult to obtain. While advances in technology are creating new 
opportunities for firms to directly facilitate and manage consumer social interactions, 
they also impose new challenges. Distinct strategic managerial actions are often 
necessary in such new social marketplaces. Although there have been many studies 
on the significance of peer effects, my study is one of the first attempts to understand 
how such increased information visibility on “others” affects an individual’s behavior 
and ultimately advertising effectiveness in the social media marketplace.  
 From a theoretical perspective, my study complements and extends the 
literature in IS that has studied social influences in technology adoption, use and 
diffusion behavior. In particular, I empirically test and extend social influence 




in alleviating the negative impacts of the advertisements, and its essential role as a 
new mechanism for advertising effectiveness.  
 My findings not only ventures to gain a richer theoretical understanding of 
social influence, but also to find ways through which one might ultimately increase 
the effectiveness of social media marketing and viral product diffusion. The results of 
this study offer some interesting implications for firms in managing consumer social 
interactions and advertising. My work also sheds light on how viral products can be 
designed to foster social contagion.  
 I conduct my study on a Facebook App, and present important new results on 
how social information in advertisements impacts user adoption, use and diffusion, 
and, ultimately, the advertising effectiveness. Overall, I find that social information 
has econometrically identifiable positive impacts on social influence, product 
diffusion and ultimately advertising effectiveness. Interestingly, it seems that with the 
increase of ad clutter online, advertisements with no social information have a 
negative impact on App use. This finding provides managers and technology 
developer’s compelling evidence on the importance of emphasizing social 
information in designing their communication strategies. Furthermore, since the 
combination of social features seems to drive a positive feedback loop in which 
product use drives peer adoption, and peer adoption drives product use. If so, 
managers should seek to enable this feedback loop by designing both viral features 
and social features into their products.   
 I also examine how media engagement interacts with social information.  My 




effective in terms of use and diffusion. Media engagement has a significant positive 
impact only when social information is visible. Studies have shown that consumer 
avoidance of advertising in a traditional advertising medium increases with 
consumption of the medium by way of repeated exposures (Elliott & Speck 1998; 
Speck & Elliott 1997). My findings highlight how this perception is now evident in 
Web 2.0, in that traditional online advertising and traditional media engagement may 
no longer be as effective, and they underscore the importance of use of social 
information in online advertising. This result provides important information to 
managers and technological developers, given that technology is evolving at a fast 
pace, their marketing methods and strategy design should reflect this evolution.
 Furthermore, I not only examine the social information on first degree friends, 
but also second degree friends. Thus, I am able to also assess the influence of the 
behavior of those with whom the focal individual may only come into contact 
infrequently, such as at shopping malls or  social events. My results underscore the 
salience of these more digital “influences” in driving adoption, use and diffusion.  
 I also look closely at the interaction effect of social information and media 
engagement. I find that for user generated content (direct user impact) active social 
sources have a stronger impact than passive social sources. Yet passive social sources 
are more effective than active social sources towards the overall system - in terms of 
the indirect use outcome (passengering). As for diffusion, I find that active social 
sources of information are more effective than passive social sources of information 
when it comes to local diffusion. More interestingly, and in contrast to the general 




when it is active, I find that  in terms of network reach and beyond-local diffusion, 
passive social information sources have a stronger impact than active social 
information sources. In general, active social advertising is more locally effective but 
less globally effective than passive social advertising, therefore managers should 
optimally design their viral features accordingly. In particular, to foster diffusion 
marketers should invest in passive social advertising methods. These findings 
highlight the importance of understanding the different features in social media 
marketing, and could enable firms to optimally create and manage social contagion 
when it comes to new product diffusion.   
 Findings from my study indicate that firms would do best to optimize their 
investment in advertisements such that they provide different levels of information to 
induce different outcomes. For example, to encourage App virality, ads should 
include sharing information such as a link to share the App with their friends, and 
provide information that “User X” has shared the App with “User Z.” This type of 
social information might further induce virality for the App and the overall success of 
the ad. 
 Another interesting finding is that the Facebook privacy settings of a user 
have a significant impact on user behavior in terms of App use and diffusion. This 
finding will allow managers and marketers to target users more precisely by factoring 
in the Facebook privacy settings of a user in their marketing algorithms. This will 
reduce marketing costs and will enable firms to be more efficient. 
 Overall my study provides empirical evidence on how Web 2.0 has changed 




their social information as an essential marketing medium. Firms can use the findings 
here to develop guidelines for optimal investments in various social marketing 
methods. The findings of my study would guide platform developers to enable and 
constrain the visibility of information that operates in their ecosystem, and to 
engineer the user experience to increase sharing, interaction and virality.  
2.7 Limitations and Future Work 
As for my study, although I was able to collect a subsample of the users that saw the 
advertisement for the App and did not “Like” the App, I could not observe all of the 
users. Future studies can replicate my study and control for this selection bias by use 
of randomized experiments. In addition, I was only able to collect gender and location 
as demographic information, and although I used hazard models to account for the 
omitted variable bias, other demographic information, such as education and work, 
might have an impact on outcomes.  
 Also, I was not able to directly measure the strength of the social tie between 
users. A fine grained analysis could be useful to provide additional insight into social 
information of different “strengths,” and their impact on user behavior. Also, a 
natural question that arises is whether some social information from certain friends is 
more salient and “influential” than others. Rogers (1995) refers to such individuals in 
his identification of opinion leaders, as fundamental forces in the diffusion of 
innovations. The identification of such leaders of social information would be an 
interesting and important area for future research. 
 Although it is abundantly clear that social influence is present, the precise 




understood. I identified social information as a possibility, but there may be others, 
and my analysis does not allow me to distinguish between them. More qualitative 
data via interviews or surveys may shed further light on this issue. Some studies on 
the adoption over the Internet have shown that non-adoption was driven by a different 
set of factors (for example, fear of obsolescence, mistrust), from those driving 
adoption (Brown & Venkatesh, 2005). It would be interesting to examine what role 
social information plays in non-adoption of Apps, and whether social information can 
relieve or compound such fears.  
 Research on advertising has shown that repeated exposure to traditional 
advertising media triggers the ad schema, thus leading to a reduction in the 
effectiveness of the ad (Elliott & Speck 1998; Speck & Elliott 1997). My study 
provides evidence on how social information can alleviate such triggers. However, 
with time, this notion could also take form in the context of social information. With 
the increased use of social media advertising, online consumers might be bombarded 
with social advertising which might ultimately trigger their ad schemas. Therefore, 
future studies should examine if users, with time, change their ad schemas towards 
social media advertising, and how the type of social information presented can help 
mitigate this effect.    
 Lastly, because my detailed study was limited to a single App, corroboration 
of these novel findings by subsequent research would be useful. This is especially so 
as both the amount of adoption, use and diffusion of the product is likely to be 




generalized to most Facebook Apps, and to social media advertising that functions in 




Chapter 3: Information Spillover and Strategic Behaviors in 
Open Innovation Crowdsourcing Contests: An Empirical 
Investigation 
3.1 Introduction 
The ability of online markets to efficiently bring together individuals and businesses 
has redefined and transformed traditional ways of conducting business. More 
recently, there has been an explosion of new business models that leverage online 
interactions and the “wisdom of the crowds”. In particular, firms have increasingly 
begun to leverage online crowdsourcing marketplaces to seek solutions to business 
problems as well as to undertake research – activities that were traditionally 
performed within the boundaries of the organization.  Crowdsourcing markets use a 
distributed problem solving and production model and seek to tap into the wisdom of 
crowds to provide solutions or products for firms (Kleemann et al., 2008). Lego, for 
instance, encourages its most fanatical customers to redesign its famous sets 
(Rodgers, 2011). Other big corporations such as Dell, have turned customer 
complaints into increased profit margins by tapping the crowd for solutions to their 
problems (Bensen, 2013). An important objective of these crowdsourcing markets is 
to attract high quality solvers, and to obtain good, diverse solutions (Terwiesch & 
Ulrich, 2009; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). The effectiveness and success of a 
crowdsourcing marketplace depends largely on the market’s ability to not only 
incentivize participants to submit high quality solutions, but also deter strategic 




 Most online crowdsourcing markets use “contests”, with anonymous users 
(“the crowd”) submitting solutions to the contest holder’s problem and competing for 
prize money. Contest design plays a crucial role in the success of the marketplace. It 
is widely recognized that contestants’ incentive to exert effort depends largely on the 
competitive environment as defined by the rules of the contest. Contests are often 
characterized by a number of parameters such as the number of players, heterogeneity 
of players, the number and amount of prizes, and the information available to 
participants, among others. All of these factors play an important role in influencing 
the behavior of individual players. While a number of these factors play a critical role 
in offline contests as well, an important development in online contests is the 
increased availability of information – in particular, information relating to other 
contestants.  Two broad categories of contests are popular in online crowdsourcing 
markets – open contests, wherein information about other contestants are made 
visible to all participants, and closed (also known as blind) contests, wherein the 
visibility of such information is limited. Open contests in particular, such as the one 
used in the marketplace I study, make information about a contestant as well as her 
submissions visible to all other contestants. While this encourages greater 
participation, open contests also suffer from a number of drawbacks.  
 Participants in these online crowdsourcing markets are faced with a number of 
strategic choices – an important choice being the order of submission or timing of 
entry in a contest. While early movers (i.e., contestants who submit early) may enjoy 
some benefits and also be able to deter entry of later contestants, late movers might 




feature of online innovation contests is the provision of feedback to contestants by the 
contest holders. Given the uncertainties surrounding the contest holder’s requirements 
and tastes, feedback provided by the contest holder on the submissions can be very 
helpful to the contestant in refining their solutions. In particular, early submissions 
have a higher likelihood of obtaining valuable feedback that can help early entrants to 
refine and resubmit their solutions. While early entrants are more likely to benefit 
from feedback provided on their submission, the visibility of such feedback 
information to all contestants can provide later entrants valuable information that 
increases their chances of winning the contest. Poorly designed contests can dissuade 
potential submissions, while well-designed contests that deter strategic gaming by 
participants and can stimulate participation and growth of online crowdsourcing 
markets. Understanding how informational spillovers in open innovation contests 
impact the entry behaviors of contestants and their likelihood of winning can provide 
valuable insights into the effectiveness of open innovation contests.  
 My study analyzes data from one of the largest online crowdsourcing markets 
for design to examine the strategic behavior of contestants and their impact on 
outcomes. The marketplace I study allows individuals or businesses to setup contests 
for the design of logos, graphics, and websites. Contestants are usually individual 
designers who compete to provide solutions, with the winner being financially 
rewarded. The marketplace uses two types of contests (a) an open contest, where all 
submissions by contestants as well as the associated feedback provided by the contest 
holder are visible to all the participants, and (b) a blind contest, where information 




different types of contests enables us to study the role of informational spillovers 
relating to submissions as well as feedback on the strategic entry decisions of 
contestants as well as its impact on their likelihood of winning.  
 More specifically, this study seeks to investigate the following questions.  
1) How do informational spillovers relating to submissions (i.e., the ability to see 
earlier submissions) influence a focal contestant’s behavior (timing of entry) and 
her likelihood of winning?  
2) How do informational spillovers relating to feedback (i.e., the ability to see the 
feedback provided by the contest holder to earlier submissions) influence a focal 
contestant’s behavior (timing of entry) and her likelihood of winning? Further, 
how does the type of feedback (specific versus generic) 6 impact these outcomes? 
 I find that contest design, particularly relating to information visibility, 
significantly influences contestant’s behavior as well as outcomes. Both early 
submissions as well as late submissions are more likely to win a contest compared to 
submissions at other times during the contest. In examining the impact of 
informational spillovers relating to the submissions, we find that late submissions are 
more likely to win in open contests. However, in blind contests where there are no 
informational spillovers and when no feedback is provided by the contest holder, 
there are no specific submission times that perform better than others. Only a contest 
holder’s expertise, experience, and skill are associated with her likelihood of winning 
the contest. I also find evidence of informational spillovers relating to feedback. 
Interestingly, in both open as well as blind contests, when feedback is provided by the 
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contest holder to contestants, I find that early submissions are more likely to win, 
particularly when these early contestants make a resubmission.  
 I also find that the benefits from informational spillovers differ depending on 
the type of feedback provided by the contest holder. In open contests with feedback, 
the more specific the feedback given to others in a contest, the higher the chances of 
late submissions winning the contest. However, in blind contests where users cannot 
see each other’s submissions, specific feedback given to other contestants does not 
benefit a focal user, while generic feedback increases the likelihood of late 
submissions winning the contest. 
 Finally, in examining the role of skill, experience, and expertise, I find that in 
the case of open contests, contestants with high skill, experience, or expertise that 
submit late are more likely to win. However, in the case of blind contests with 
feedback, I find that high skilled contestants who submit early are more likely to win.  
 My findings suggest that contestants in these markets strategically time their 
submissions to increase their chances of winning the contest. Interestingly, it is the 
contestants with higher skills, experience, and expertise that are more likely to act 
strategically and win the contest. My results have interesting implications for the 
design of innovation contests. While feedback provided by the contest holder to a 
contestant could benefit that contestant, I find that when this feedback is very 
specific, the informational spillovers are higher and other contestants that submit later 
tend to benefit from such feedback. Such information spillovers might not be 
detrimental to the contest holder; however they could discourage contestants from 




submissions as well as feedback could help later contestants converge to a winning 
solution more quickly, they could have an unintended side effect of reducing variety. 
Blind contests, on the other hand, could promote greater variety by reducing 
information spillovers from earlier submissions. 
 My study makes a number of contributions. It is one of the first studies to 
examine the role of informational spillovers in open innovation contests and the 
consequences of such informational spillovers. Using data on open as well as blind 
contests with and without feedbacks, my study is able to tease out the differing 
impacts of informational spillovers relating to submission and feedbacks. While a few 
recent studies have examined the role of the feedback process on the idea generation 
(Wooten et al., 2011), this is the first study to identify the effects of informational 
spillovers that occur when such feedback is made visible to other contestants. My 
study also contributes to the vast stream of research in marketing, economics, and 
strategy on the role of timing of entry and its implications for market outcomes. Most 
of the studies examining the timing of entry of market participants examine the 
strategic behavior of firms. This study is among the first studies to examine strategic 
entry behavior of individuals in a decentralized marketplace. Finally, and most 
importantly, my study contributes to the emerging literature on online crowdsourcing 
markets and the design of online contests. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 describes the research context and Section 4 describes the data and 




study and concludes. . Lastly, Section 7 describes the limitations of this study and 
future research.  
3.2 Literature Review 
This study draws upon research relating to a number of contexts including the optimal 
design of contests, timing of entry, the role of information externality, as well as the 
role of feedback in innovations. 
 3.2.1 Design of Contests 
 Most of the work relating to contest design is analytical in nature. Prior work 
has examined a number of contest-related factors to examine their impact on 
outcomes. One stream of literature has focused on the “prize structure”, including 
how many prizes should be offered and how the total award should be allocated 
among them. Kalra and Shi (2001) study a multiple-player model of sales contests 
and find that the number of prizes should be increased and the spread should be 
decreased when salespeople are more risk averse. Glazer and Hassin (1988) and 
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study the design of prize structures in contests in which 
contestants differ in skills. Glazer and Hassin show that the winner-take-all design is 
optimal if the skill distribution is uniform and the performance function is linear. 
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) show that the winner-take-all design is optimal under 
general distributions, as long as the performance function is linear. Lastly, Liu et al. 
(2007) study a one period model of a consumer contest in which consumers’ 
performance is a multiplicative function of their skill and consumption, and winners 




and number of contestants play an important role in determining the optimal prize 
structure in consumer contests.  
 Researchers have examined the design of an optimal contest that generates the 
highest revenue, as well as contest structures that maximize the effort exerted by 
contestants. The “contest structure” involves whether and how to segment the 
consumer population and how to choose a performance evaluation criteria. Gradstein 
and Konrad (1999), for example, provide a rationale for a multi-stage contest design 
by endogenizing the choice of contest structure.  They demonstrate that, depending on 
a return to scale parameter of the contest success function, a multi-stage contest may 
encourage higher effort by the participants than a one-stage contest. Similarly, Baik 
and Lee (2000) study a two-stage contest with effort carryovers. They show that in 
the case of player-specific effort carryovers, the rent-dissipation rate (defined as the 
ratio of the expended total effort to the value of the prize) increases in the carryover 
rate and the rent is fully dissipated with carryover rate equal to one. Fu and Lu (2006) 
investigate the optimal structure of a multistage sequential-elimination contest with 
pooling competition in each stage. They show that the optimal contest excludes one 
contestant at each stage until the finale in which a single winner takes the entire prize. 
Liu et al. (2007) employ a game-theoretical approach to investigate consumer contest 
design issues, including segmentation, and handicapping. They find that increasing 
contest size is beneficial to the marketer and that the marketer may achieve less 
dispersive skill distributions by segmenting or screening contestants according to 





 While there is a growing body of theoretical research examining the impact of 
different contest parameters, empirical research on the impact of contest design is 
scant, and has been limited to examining the impact of prize on effort exerted. For 
example, Maloney and McCormick (2000), analyze responses of individual runners to 
different prizes. They find a significant relation between the performance and the 
prize value and that higher prize values are associated with higher effort levels. Lynch 
and Zax (2000) examine data on road races in the United States.  They find that the 
performance increases in response to larger prize spreads. However, when controlling 
for ability, the impact of the prize spread disappears. The authors conclude that the 
larger prize spreads produce better performance not because they encourage all 
runners to run faster but because they attract faster runners. A recent experimental 
study by Shermeta (2011) compares the performance of four simultaneous lottery 
contests and the effort levels exerted. Most of the empirical studies of contest design 
focus on contests in offline settings. An exception is a recent study by Huang et al. 
(2012), where the authors examine the effect of incentive prize structure design of 
online crowdsourcing contests on the solutions produced by the crowd. They use data 
from a crowdsourcing marketplace Threadless, and find that participants exert less 
effort as competition for the prize increases, indicating that the prize may adversely 
affect the quality of the solutions produced by the crowd. 
 While the “prize structure” as well as the “contest structure” are important 
determinants of a number of outcomes of interest, there are hardly any studies that 
have examined the differences in “information structures” – in particular, information 




first to empirically examine the role of different information visibility regimes on the 
behavior of contestants as well as contest outcomes in online settings.   
 3.2.2 Timing of Entry 
 There is substantial theoretical and analytical research that highlights the 
importance of timing of entry for market participants (for instance see, Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988; Urban & Star, 1991). First movers, for instance, have been 
shown to deter entry of later entrants by locking in consumers (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988; Klemperer, 1987; Dewan et al., 2003; Lee & Grewal, 2004). 
Other studies have explored additional benefits of early entry including the evidence 
of scale effects (Rao & Rutenberg, 1979), experience effects (Smiley & Ravid, 1983), 
asymmetric information about product quality and risk averse buyers (Conrad, 1983), 
and reputational effects (Bain, 1956; Krouse, 1984), among others. In contrast to 
these studies of early mover advantages, other studies find that late movers have an 
advantage when they can lower their uncertainty and costs by learning from the 
experiences of early movers (Reinganum, 1981; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1985; Dutta et 
al., 2005; Hoppe, 2000; Hoppe & Lehmann‐Grube, 2004). The main disadvantage of 
pioneers is that it is generally more costly to be a pioneer than to be an early follower 
or a late entrant since product innovation tends to be more  costly  than  product  
imitation  (Mansfield et al.,  1981;  Levin  et  al.,  1987). Other studies have explored 
how a later entrant can diminish the impact of the first movers by moving away from 
the first mover, and by developing a more desirable position (Carpenter & Nakamoto, 




 Findings of empirical studies examining the impacts of timing of entry are 
mixed (for reviews of empirical findings see, Kerin et al., 1992; Robinson et al., 
1994; Kalyanaram et al., 1995; Zahra et al., 1995; Mueller, 1997; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1998). For instance, Robinson and Fornell (1985) analyzed 371 
consumer goods firms and found that first movers had around 20 percent higher 
market shares than later entrants. Similarly, Robinson (1988) studied 1209 mature 
industrial goods businesses and found that order of entry alone explained 8.9% of the 
variation in market share and that first movers had higher market shares than later 
entrants. Other studies have also found support for first mover advantages (for 
example, Lillien & Yoon, 1990; Cooper, 1979; Lieberman, 1989; Parry & Bass, 
1990).  Other empirical studies have found that later movers have higher market share 
and better performance than early movers. Shankar, Carpenter and Krishnamurthi 
(1998) examine brand sales in the prescription drug market and find than an 
innovative late mover can create sustainable advantage. Huff and Robinson (1994) 
also find that pioneer’s relative market share declines over time with competition. 
Other studies examining firms have also found negative effects of early entry (for 
example, Kalyanaram & Wittink, 1994; Brown & Lattin, 1994; Sullivan, 1992; 
Mascarenhas, 2006). Most of the empirical research on timing of entry to market has 
been limited to offline settings and have focused on the firm as the primary unit of 
analysis. 
 More recently, there has been growing number of empirical studies on timing 
of entry of individual participants in online auction marketplaces. Studies on online 




ways leading to opposing conclusions. On the one hand studies have found that a 
significant amount of bidders bid early in the auction (Bajari & Hortacsu¸ 2003; 
Hasker et al., 2004), while on the other, studies have found that a substantial fraction 
of bidders submit their bids towards the end of an auction (Ockenfels & Roth, 2002, 
2006; Roth & Ockenfels, 2002). Early bidding can lower a bidder’s cost of searching 
for alternatives, at the same time making other competitors less interested in 
competing (Vadovic, 2009). Studies have also shown that entry deterrence incentive 
leads bidders to bid early to discourage other bidders from entering the auction 
(Nekipelov, 2007). Although a late online bid is at a large risk of not being 
successfully transmitted due to network traffic (Bajari & Hortaçsu, 2004) and is 
discouraged by online auction sites, late bidding softens competition compared to 
early bidding (Bajari & Hortaçsu, 2004) and is a deliberate strategy meant to avoid 
incremental bidding or ‘price war’ behaviors (Schindler, 2003; Bajari & Hortaçsu, 
2004; Roth & Ockenfels, 2002). In addition, late bidding is considered to be a best 
response strategy at times for informed bidders to protect their information (Roth & 
Ockenfels, 2002) and prevent learning (Nekipelov, 2007). 
 Despite the recent growth of crowdsourcing marketplaces, little attention has 
been paid to timing of entry in online crowdsourcing contests. The findings from a 
few recent studies have shown mixed results. Archak (2010) examines a 
crowdsourcing software development website TopCoder.com, and finds that high 
rated contestants face tougher competition in the contest phase. Yet they strategically 
play Stackelberg leaders in the registration phase of the contest by committing early 




(2011) use Taskn.com to show that winners are more likely to be those who submit 
early or later during the submission period as opposed to those submit in the middle. 
They also find that intentionally waiting to submit solutions later is associated with 
higher winning probability. Yet they find evidence of such behavior only in the 
context of pure ideation based projects such as naming projects and creative writing 
projects. 
 The multiplicity of explanations provided in the literature regarding the 
evidence and causes of timing of entry enables us to appreciate the richness and 
complexity of markets, and in particular the importance of entry time as a competitive 
strategic choice in different market structures. These studies highlight the importance 
of understanding the role of different market structures and “information structures” 
on the timing of entry. Thus far most of the empirical research on time to entry has 
been conducted on the firm level of analysis and in offline settings. This study is 
among the first to empirically examine the impact of different information visibility 
regimes on contestants’ timing of entry and their related outcomes in an online 
crowdsourcing marketplace.  
 3.2.3 Information Spillover 
 The impact and value of information spillover or information externalities 
have been examined in wide variety of fields, including economics, IT and finance. 
There are various strands of research relating to information spillover in different 
literatures; however, the main idea is that the lack of information about some essential 
variable that is of public interest can be compensated for, at least partially, by looking 




available to agent A to form his decision has some value for agent B (a neighbor of 
A) the observation of A’s actions can help B make a better decision since A’s actions 
will partly reveal his information.  
 In general information spillover occurs when each agent has some private 
piece of information which, if combined with the others’ would increase the 
information available to each about some relevant common variable. If pooling is 
ruled out, each agent’s private information will be embedded in his decisions.  The 
other agents’ choices become an alternative source of information. As a consequence, 
individual agents’ decisions will be affected both by their private information and by 
other agents’ actions. Specifically, private information spills over through individual 
actions. In the open innovation contest, the lack of information on the taste of the 
contest holder is the main variable of interest for all contestants. Visibility of certain 
information can provide insights into the taste of the contest holder which can be 
harvested by each agent.  
 Most of the work relating to information spillovers is analytical in nature. 
Prior theoretical work has examined how information spillover occurs, and how it 
affects related outcomes of interest. Knowledge spillovers are external benefits 
dissipated to non-innovating firms from innovating firms due to the non-rival 
property of knowledge. Knowledge spillovers occur because accumulated knowledge 
at one firm can be transmitted to other firms due to its public good characteristics 
(Griliches 1979, 1998). In studying information spillovers, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
(2003) find that a firm’s IT-related knowledge can diffuse to rival firms through 




spillovers can result in learning, observation, and replication of others’ innovations 
(Chang & Gurbuxani, 2012). Studies have also shown that knowledge spillovers can 
in turn become the source of long-run productivity growth (Romer 1986, 1994; Coe 
& Helpman, 1995). Other studies have argued that information spillovers diminish 
the incentive of innovators to undertake information production in the first place 
(Benveniste et al., 2002; Hoffmann-Burchardi, 2001). In innovation contests one 
firm’s R&D effort may spillover and benefit its rival (D’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 
1988). Kamien et al. (1992) show how positive input spillovers can affect R&D 
decisions when firms are engaged in a two-stage game of innovation.  
 Given the nature of information spillover, it is hard to empirically isolate and 
test for information spillovers (Chang & Gurbaxani, 2012). Consequently, empirical 
studies have been scarce and most are experimental studies conducted in offline 
settings. Cheng and Nault (2007) focus on industry-level spillover benefits that result 
from IT investments made by upstream industries. Chang and Gurbuxani (2012) 
examine the effects that result from IT related spillovers on firm level productivity. 
Experimental studies, mostly in the finance, have found that the disclosure of 
information about a firm presented in different ways affects the valuations and trades 
of investors and even experienced financial analysts (Hirst & Hopkins, 1998; Dietrich 
et al., 2001; Hopkins et al., 2000). There is also evidence that individuals fail to make 
use of all publicly available information (Lipe, 1998).There is other evidence 
suggesting that investors’ and analysts’ assessments are influenced by the format and 




 Thus far research on information spillover has been largely theoretical, and 
the few empirical studies have been conducted in offline settings at industry and firm 
level of analysis. There are hardly any studies that have empirically examined 
information spillovers at the individual level in online settings. This study is among 
the first to empirically examine the role of information spillovers on the behavior of 
contestants and related outcomes in online crowdsourcing markets for innovation.  
 3.2.4 Feedback in Innovation Processes 
 Several motivation theories attest that feedback is effective for motivating 
goal pursuit because it increases outcome expectancy of the goal and perceived self-
efficacy of the pursuer (Atkinson, 1964; Bandura & Cervone, 1983; Lewin, 1935; 
Weiner, 1974; Zajonc & Brickman, 1969). Feedback on successful and failed actions 
allows individuals to adjust and direct their efforts to match the challenge they are 
facing (Bandura, 1991; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Festinger, 1954; Locke & Latham, 
1990). The fundamental idea that information can lead to learning is explored in the 
literature of mental models. Mental models activate when new information is 
incorporated into one’s base of knowledge, resulting in conceptual change. 
Enhancement occurs when consistent information reinforces the existing framework, 
and revision occurs when the new information is inconsistent with prior beliefs 
(Vosniadou, 1994). Vosniadou points out that learning failures are more probable 
when revisions are needed, which can produce inconsistencies. This suggests that 
feedback schemes that increase the amount of accurate information will reduce 
misunderstandings, enrich learning related to the quality function, and thus improve 




 A significant amount of empirical research has been conducted on the role of 
feedback and  innovation. Tjosvold and McNelly (1988) study organizations and 
demonstrate that the quality and type of communication, rather than its frequency, 
improves organizational innovation. Their findings supports the theory that 
interaction and feedback will lead to increased levels of innovation. At the group 
level, several empirical studies link higher levels of information gathering and both 
internal and external group communication with better performance (Katz, 1982; 
Keller, 1986). Highsmith (1978) suggests that a lack of meaningful, positive feedback 
largely reduces the rate of idea generation in group sessions. He conducts a simulated 
study in an organizational context, and finds that the average number of ideas 
combined goes down in the absence of communication. However, when there is 
variability in communication, there is no effect on the average number of proposals 
combined or on the variance (Seshadri & Shapira, 2003). A recent field experiment 
conducted on online contests by Wooten and Ulrich (2011) find that the type of 
feedback (star ratings) given to a particular user is associated with differences in 
performance in the idea generation process.  
 The increase in interest on the role of feedback has been mainly due to Web 
2.0, and due to the emergence of online feedback mechanisms. These mechanisms 
have proved to be viable for fostering cooperation among strangers by ensuring that 
the behavior is publicly visible, and may therefore, affect the behavior of users in the 
community. To date, most empirical studies have been conducted in offline settings. 
The unit of analysis thus far has been on firm and group level, with the exception of 




examine the role of feedback, at the individual level, on the behavior of contestants 
and contest outcomes in the online setting of open innovation crowdsourcing 
marketplace. 
 In open innovation crowdsourcing contests, contest holders can give direct 
feedback to users in the form of a star rating, textual feedback, or both. This feedback 
(star ratings or text reviews) is not only visible to the contestant given the feedback to 
but also to the rest of the contestants. While online feedback is visible not only to the 
user to whom feedback is given but also to the rest of the community, to date most 
studies have analyzed the direct impact of feedback on a user; what has not yet been 
studied is how different types of feedback given to a user impacts not only her 
behavior but also the behavior of other contestants in the contest. This study seeks to 
fill an important research gap, namely, the role of feedback provided to others on the 
behavior of contestants and contest outcomes in an open innovation crowdsourcing 
marketplace. 
 3.2.5 Research Hypotheses 
 Although submitting early will lead to higher chance of getting feedback, and 
being able to work upon the feedback for a higher probability of winning, I argue that 
information spillovers through the visibility of information in the contest benefits late 
entry since imitation costs are lower than production costs. In particular, when the 
design submissions are visible, design information spills over and contestants are able 
to see each other’s designs.  The visibility of designs in a contest, benefits contestants 




higher probability of winning.  Thus, I hypothesize that in open innovation contests, 
moving later will lead to a higher probability of winning.  
Proposition 1: Visibility of designs of other contestants in a contest will benefit a 




 and submit later; 
leading to a higher probability of winning. 
 Winning a design contest is mainly based on the tastes of a contest holder 
(Terwiesch & Xu, 2008).  These tastes cannot be readily measured. However, 
feedback given in a contest by a contest holder can be used to signal the taste of a 
contest holder. Since feedback is visible to all in a contest, contestants are able to 
benefit from the information spillover of the contest holders’ tastes from the feedback 
given to others in a contest when designs are visible; and build upon the feedback to 
their own designs. I therefore propose:  
Proposition 2a:   Visibility of feedback to other contestants in a contest will benefit a 
contestant, such that she will “strategically wait” to build upon the feedback; leading 
to a higher probability of winning.  
 Moreover, different types of feedback send out different forms of information. 
Text feedback in online contests is visible to all. Whether the text feedback is more 
general or more specific drives different levels of information spillover. Text 
feedback can be specific (for example, “I like submission X but please try a different 
shade of color.”) or more generic (for example, “I like the submissions thus far but I 
would like to see more flowers.”).  When information about a specific feedback 
provided to a contestant spills over, other contestants can make better use of the 
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feedback as compared to generic feedback. Therefore, if a contestant is given specific 
feedback when designs are visible, later entrant benefit more, than if the feedback is 
generic.  I therefore propose: 
Proposition 2b:   The higher the specificity of the feedback to other contestants in a 
contest, the higher the information spillover to a contestant; thus later submission 
will lead to a higher probability of winning.    
3.3 Research Context 
In this study I use one of the most dominant crowdsourcing contest design websites to 
study the role of information externalities and their impact on the strategic behavior 
of participants. The community is a design crowdsourcing website where contests are 
held and users submit logos or website designs.  
 Figure 3.1 describes the 4 steps of the contest process from start to finish. The 
main steps are (1) Contest Launch, (2) Submissions, (3) Feedback, and (4) 
Announcing the Winner. Below I describe the steps more extensively. 
 3.3.1 Contest Launch 
 To launch a contest, a contest holder provides the following information: 
 Contest Prize (the online community used in this study has a minimum prize 
of $299). 
 Design description. The contest holder needs to provide project details which 
usually include objective, slogans, and any other information the contest 




 The contest type, whether open or blind. Blind contests are contests where the 
submitted solutions (logos, for this study) are not visible to anyone in the 
contest except for the contest holder. Open contests are contest where the 
submissions are visible to everyone. Also blind contests are hidden from 
search engines like Google, whereas open contests are visible in search 
engines.  
 The contest can then be launched and displayed in the design marketplace. 
Logo designs contests are open for 7 days. The contests are displayed based on the 
ending dates.  
 3.3.2 Submissions 
 Designers (contestants) who wish to enter a contest view and evaluate the 
contest. Figure 3.2 displays how contests are displayed in an open innovation 
marketplace. Designers can view several contests, the type of the contest (open or 
blind), the title of each contest, the end date, the number of entries, the prize amount, 
the contest holder, and details about the contest and contest holder. Figure 3.3 
displays the information made public on the contest holder. Users can not only view 
current open contests of a contest holder, but also contest holders’ past activity in 
terms of total contests held, total prizes awarded, and average feedback.  Users can 
get more information on the contest requirements by viewing the design brief as 
shown in Figure 3.4. In addition, users are able to see the current submissions in a 
contest. Figure 3.5 displays submission entries of contestants along with the star 
feedback given by the contest holder. Users are able to obtain further information on 




which lists the total contests entered and won by the contestant, as well as her 
portfolio of designs.  
 Designers can submit a solution at any time before the end of the contest. If 
the contest is open, designers can see submission of other contestants; however, if the 
contest is blind, designers cannot see submission of other contestants.  A key decision 
for a contestant is when to submit, (that is, early or late in the contest). Figure 3.7 
shows the submission order frequency on the lifetime of the contests- note that while 
there is a high number of early entrants there is also a high number of late entrants.  
 3.3.3 Feedback  
 After contestants begin submitting solutions, the contest holder is encouraged 
by the community to send feedback to solvers about their solutions by communicating 
her average feedback % score. A contest holders average feedback (%) score depends 
on the amount of feedback given in previous contests. Feedback by a contest holder 
to contestants is given in two ways - (a) star rating of one to five stars on a 
submission, and (b) text feedback.  I observe that contestants usually prefer to submit 
improved solutions after receiving feedback. Although the community encourages 
feedback there are quite a large number of contest holders that do not provide any 
feedback. Figure 3.8 displays the text feedback frequency, and Figure 3.9 shows the 
star feedback frequency. On average, both figures show that feedback is mainly given 
at the early stages of the contest timeline, and decreasing in frequency towards the 




 3.3.4 Announcing the Winner 
 Once the contest duration ends, the contest holder then announces a winner 
who is awarded the prize.  
3.4 Data and Methodology 
I collect data in 3 time periods, namely (a) Nov 2010, (b) April 2011, and (c) Nov 
2011- Oct 2012. The sample is composed of 3,893,221 designer participations (or 
submissions) in 16,645 contests. 13,225 are open contests (of which 6091 have 
feedback  and 7134 do not), and 3420 are blind contests (of which 2417 have 
feedback and 1003 do not). Table 3.1 lists the variables and their descriptions. Table 
3.2a reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. On average, 
contest holders have held around 3 contests, have awarded around $718, and have 
provided an average of 70% feedback. Contestants on average have been on the 
crowdsourcing community for around 422 days, have an average of 13 wins, and 
have entered an average of 287 contests. Contests on average have 211 entries, 69 
designers, and a prize of $517. 
 Table 3.2b reports the descriptive statistics of the variables in terms of the 
different contest designs and information regimes. Namely, (a) open contests with 
feedback, (b) open contests with no feedback, (c) blind contests with feedback, and 
(d) blind contests with no feedback. Table 3.2b displays that on average, there are 
more submission entries for open contests with feedback (267) than for open with no 
feedback (228), and even fewer for blind contests (197 with feedback and 151 with 
no feedback). A similar pattern is also reported in terms of the number of designers. 




20 percentile of submissions) have the highest number of resubmissions. In addition, 
for open contests, the averages reported for late submitters in terms of skill is higher 
than the averages reported for early and middle submitters.  Yet for blind contests, the 
averages reported for early submitters in terms of skill is higher than the averages 
reported for late and middle submitters. The reported averages suggest that 
contestants with different skills are likely to have different entry times. Figure 3.10a 
briefly describes the benefits and drawbacks to a contest holder on the choice of the 
contest design, and Figure 3.10b briefly describes the benefits and drawbacks of a 
contestant on the choice of time to entry.  
3.4.1 Variables  
 The following sections describe the variables used in this study. The data is in 
panel form and the unit of analysis is the contestant i in contest t. 
 3.4.1.1 Dependent Variable  
 The main dependent variable in this study is a binary variable winner_dummy, 
indicating whether or not the contestant i won contest t. 
 3.4.1.2 Independent Variables 
 To examine the impact of information spillover on contestant time of entry 
and contest outcome, I explore the following categories of explanatory variables 
related to the contestant i in contest t: (1) Submission order, (2) Feedback to others in 
a contest, (3) Direct feedback to a contestant, (4) Resubmissions, and (4) Expertise 




 To capture timing of entry behavior I measure c_suborder, the order of the 
first submission of a contestant i in contest t, along with submission order squared 
c_subOrder2 to capture any late strategic behavior.  
 Feedback by a contest holder to a contestant is either given through stars or 
through text. Both types of feedback (stars and text) are visible to others in a contest. 
To capture information spillover in terms of star feedback given to others, I measure 
the following metrics (a) c_maxstar_prior: the maximum star rating given in a 
contest t at the time of entry of a contestant i, (b) c_avgstar_prior: the average star 
rating given in a contest t at the time of entry of a contestant i, and (c) 
c_ttlnumuserswithstars_prior: the total number of users that were given stars in a 
contest t at the time of entry of a contestant i. In terms of textual feedback, I 
employed a Linguistics Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) program to categorize the 
type of feedback given in a contest. I find that feedback is either given to a specific 
submission, for example, the feedback contains a callout to a submission number or a 
username, or is general and given to no particular submission (see Figure 3.11 for 
examples). I construct contest_SpecificFdbk to measure the total count of the 
specificity of the feedback given to others in the contest t at the time of contestant i’s 
entry, and contest_GenericFdbk, to measure the total count of generic feedback given 
in a contest t at the time of a contestant i’s entry.  
 To examine the impact of direct feedback given to a contestant i, I construct 
two metrics to quantify both types of feedback. The first metric c_feedback_dum, 




second metric c_max_star, measures the maximum star rating given to the contestant 
in contest t. 
 I further explore total submission behavior of a contestant. I construct two 
metrics to measure resubmissions of a contestant i in contest t. c_ttl_resubs, measures 
the total number of resubmissions of a contestant i in contest t, and c_timeToResubmit 
measures the lag between one resubmission and the next of a contestant i in contest t.  
 Lastly, I construct three different metrics to measure contestants i’s expertise 
and past experience: (a) c_skill –measures of past wins of contestant i divided by the 
total number of contest participations, (b) c_experience-  measures the total number 
of contest participations of contestant i in the community, and (c) c_expertise_dum- a 
binary variable that indicates whether contestant i participates in more than logo 
contests within the community (for example, website designs, banner design, t-shirt 
design).  
 3.4.1.3 Controls 
 I include several additional controls in my analysis. In particular, I control for 
(a) Contestant-Related Factors: Total number of days in the community, total number 
of contests currently participating in (b) Contest-Related Factors: total number of 
entries, and amount of contest prize, contest design description length, and (c) 
Contest Holder - Related Factors: total number of matches held, total prize amount 





 3.4.2 Empirical Model 
 The main objective of this study is to measure the effect of information 
spillovers on the contestant’s timing of submission and the probability of her winning 
the contest. I examine different contest designs in particular open contests and blind 
contests. To test my propositions, I examine the probability of winning a contest 
based on the submission order, the feedback given in a contest whether to the 
contestant herself or to other contestants in a contest, along with other variables such 
as contestant expertise, and resubmissions in a contest. I also control for contestant 
variables, contest controls and contest holder controls as described in section 3.4.1. 
My data is in panel form, and the unit of analysis is the contestant (i) in contest (t), in 
particular, in its simplest form I estimate the following model: 
   Prob(Winningit = 1 | x) = F(x, β) 
where x entails the full set of explanatory and control variables and β are the 
coefficients of interest, in particular,  
 P(Winningit = 1| x) = F(Contestant Submissionit Orderit, Feedback to Others 
in Contestit, Direct Feedback to Contestantit, Contestant Expertiseit, Contestant 
Resubmissionsit, Contestant Controlsit, Contest Controlst, Contest Holder Controlst) 
+ εit                       Equation (3.1) 
 Given the complexity and difficulty in controlling for all omitted variable bias 
in terms of contestants choice of participation in contests, I need to control for 
individual effects. A standard modeling choice when faced with bias caused by 
missing variables is fixed effects (Agarwal et al., 2009). More specifically, I observe 




level, for 16,645 different contests. This panel data allows me to estimate a model 
that controls for omitted bias with individual fixed effects, 
 Winit = Xitβ+ Sit+ αit+ it                                                Equation (3.2) 
where i indicates the contestant, t denotes the time in contests, Winit is the 
observed winning dummy for contestant i in contest t such that variable Winit is 1 if 
contestant i is the winner, while Winit  is 0 for all others in the contest, Xit is a vector of 
time varying explanatory variables that includes feedback and the above specified 
variables and controls in equation (3.1), Sit is the submission order for individual i in 
contest t, αit is the unobserved individual effects, and it  is the  disturbance.  
 The above equation (3.2) can be estimated using a simple panel data fixed 
effects model. However, one concern with this strategy is that the time of entry or 
submission order may be correlated with some unobservable contestant-specific 
characteristics that may influence outcome of winning the contest. If some 
explanatory variables are correlated with errors, then ordinary least-squares 
regression gives biased and inconsistent estimates. The Wald test of exogeneity (chi2 
(1) = 5.48; p<0.05) for submission order points to the presence of endogeneity, 
implying that the parameter of interest   will be estimated with a positive bias and 
underscoring the need for an instrumental variable (IV) approach. To control for this 
potential problem, I use a Two Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) regression with IV’s. 
Under the 2SLS approach, in the first stage, each endogenous variable is regressed on 
all valid instruments, including the full set of exogenous variables in the main 
regression. Since the instruments are exogenous, these approximations of the 




provide a way to analyze the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
endogenous covariates. In the second stage, each endogenous covariate is replaced 
with its approximation estimated in the first stage and the regression is estimated as 
usual. The slope estimator thus obtained is consistent (Wooldridge, 2001). Therefore, 
I need to instrument for Sit in a two-stage least squares model to obtain consistent 
estimates.  
 The intuition behind the use of IV’s is that they are likely to be correlated with 
the relevant independent variables but uncorrelated with unobservable characteristics 
that may influence the dependent variable. Thus, valid instruments Zit predict the 
submission order but are uncorrelated with the second stage error it. Using Hausman 
and Taylor (1981) estimation method for finding an IV, I instrument for submission 
order with the average submission order in the other contests for user i at contest t. In 
theory, a user’s past submission behavior would be a good predictor of her current 
submission behavior. Feedback given to a user in contest t can also be endogenous to 
the probability of winning in contest t.  Therefore, I also instrument for Feedback of 
contestant i with the average star rating received for contestant i in other contests. 
Users’ past receipt of feedback will be a good predictor of her current feedback. Thus 
the regression model extends to a two-step fixed effects with IV: 
(1) Sit = Xitβ + Zit + α1it+ 1it           First Step Control Equation (3.3) 
(2) Winit = Xitβ+ Sit+ α2it+ 2it        Second Step Primary Equation (3.4)    
where Zit is my full set of instruments for submission order and feedback. As 
denoted earlier, Xit entails the rest of the explanatory and control variables (for 




controls and contest holder controls). The first stage estimation is the submission 
order and the second stage is the probability of winning the contest. Using this two-
step fixed effects model, I estimate the probability of winning the contest for the 
various types of contests: (a) open contests with feedback (b) open contests with no 
feedback (c) blind contests with feedback and (d) blind contests with no feedback.  I 
conduct a two stage (2SLS) Fixed Effect  and find that for all the models, the first-
stage F statistic is highly significant and much higher than the minimum value of 10, 
alleviating weak instrument concerns (Staiger & Stock, 1997). Variance inflation 
factors across all models range from 1.18 to 3.37, suggesting that the estimates 
obtained are not biased because of multicollinearity. The main drawback of the Fixed 
Effects estimator is that it prevents the use of any explanatory variables that are time 
invariant. I therefore also conduct a two stage Random Effects model to mitigate this 
drawback. 
3.5 Results 
Table 3.3 summarizes the main findings. In this section, I discuss the estimation 
results in Table 3.4 for each explanatory parameter of interest (namely, submission 
behavior, feedback to others, direct feedback to user, and expertise). The key research 
objective is to investigate the role of different information visibility regimes on the 
behavior of contestants as well as contest outcomes. Therefore, for each parameter of 
interest, I discuss the Fixed Effects coefficients for the different contest design 
regimes visibility (open with feedback, open with no feedback, blind with feedback, 
blind with no feedback).Note that both fixed effects and random effects are consistent 




 3.5.1 Submission Behavior   
 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.4 show the results for open contests with 
feedback using the fixed effects model and random effects model respectively. In this 
type of contest, both the design submissions and feedback is visible. I can make 
several inferences from the regression coefficients; in particular, I refer to the fixed 
effects model estimates in column 1. The coefficient on c_subOrder is negative and 
significant (β (c_subOrder) = -0.1223) and the coefficient on c_subOrder^2 is positive 
and significant (β (c_subOrder^2) = 0.1667), implying that winners are more likely to 
submit either early or late. The coefficients on the interaction of the expertise 
variables and c_subOrder is positive, implying that users with higher skill, expertise 
or experience and who submit late have a higher probability of winning. These 
findings suggest that later contestants benefit from information spillovers in such a 
contest regime.  
 I next examine the behavior of contestants in open contests with no feedback 
where only the design submissions are visible. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.4 show 
the results for open contests with no feedback using the fixed effects model and 
random effects model respectively. Referring to column 3, the coefficients on 
c_subOrder and c_subOrder^2 (β (c_subOrder) = 0.1634; β (c_subOrder^2) = 0.0076) are 
positive and significant, implying that the later the submission the higher the 
probability of winning. This finding shows that although there is no feedback from 
the contest holder, users are able to benefit from the information spillover of the 




 Columns 5 and 6 in Table 3.4 report the regression coefficients for blind 
contests with feedback, where design submissions are not visible, and only feedback 
is visible. Note that the signs of the coefficients of the submission order variables are 
in accordance with what one would expect for both fixed effects model (column 5) 
and random effects model (column 6). Exploring column 5, the coefficients on both 
c_subOrder and c_suborder^2 (β (c_subTime) = -0.2544; β (c_subOrder^2) = -0.0302) are 
negative and significant, implying that earlier submission entries increase the 
probability of winning the contest. The coefficients on the interaction of the expertise 
variables and c_subOrder is negative, implying that users with higher skill, expertise 
or experience and who submit early have a higher probability of winning. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that when design submissions are not visible, users do 
not benefit from late submissions (no information spillover), and instead submit early 
and build upon their own feedback.  
 Lastly, columns 7 (fixed effects model) and 8 (random effects model) of Table 
3.4 report the regression coefficients for blind contests with no feedback, where there 
is no visibility of design or feedback.  Referring to column 7, the coefficients on both 
c_subOrder and c_suborder^2 are insignificant, showing no evidence of strategic 
behavior related to timing of entry and probability of winning. Only the coefficients 
of c_skill, c_expertise_dum, and c_experience are positive and significant, indicating 
that when there is no information spillover, users are thus not able to behave 
strategically and only benefit from their own skill and expertise. 
 In conclusion, I find that in open contests with feedback (with design and 




open contests with no feedback (with only design visibility), winners submit late. In 
contrast, I find that winners seem to submit early in blind contests with feedback 
(with only feedback visibility), and I find no strategic submission behavior in blind 
contests with no feedback (no information spillover). These findings put together all 
support proposition 1. I find that when there is information spillover, users tend to use 
such information and act strategically. When there is information spillover on the 
design visibility, users strategically wait to “imitate,” build upon others’ work and 
submit late, thereby increasing their likelihood of winning the contest. However, 
when there is no information spillover, users are limited to their own skills and 
abilities and to submitting early and building upon the contest holders’ feedback 
directed to them.  
 3.5.2 Feedback to Others 
 I study the impact of the feedback to others on a users’ submission behavior 
and probability of winning a contest. I examine the impact of feedback in two ways. 
First, I explore the visibility of feedback through stars and text, next I further analyze 
the type of textual feedback provided by the contest holder.  
 3.5.2.1 Visibility of Feedback 
 I examine the impact of feedback visibility given to others on one’s 
submission behavior and the probability of winning in open and blind contests. In 
open contests where design submissions of others are visible, feedback can have 
information spillover effects, whereas in blind contests feedback has no information 
spillover effects since the design submissions of others are not visible, and, thus, 




 Referring to the regression coefficients for open contests with feedback, in 
particular column 1, I can make several interpretations from the regression 
coefficients. The coefficients on c_maxstar_prior, c_avgstar_prior, and 
c_ttlnumuserswithstars_prior (βc_maxstar_prior= -0.0007; βc_avgstar_prior = -0.0035; 
βc_ttlnumuserswithstars_prior = -0.0050) are negative and significant, implying that higher the 
feedback given to others at the time of a contestant’s first submission, the lower the 
probability of a focal contestant winning the contest. The more interesting results, 
however, are related to the coefficients for the interaction of feedback given to others 
variables, and c_subOrder. The coefficients of these interactions are positive and 
significant (β(c_maxstar_prior*subOrder)=0.1284; β(c_avgstar_prior*subOrder)= 0.1174; 
β(c_ttlnumuserswithstars_prior*subOrder) = 0.1055), implying that the higher the feedback given 
to others and the later the submission of a focal contestant, the higher the probability 
of winning the contest- supporting Proposition 2a. This result indicates that the 
visibility of feedback to other contestants will benefit a contestant as it provides 
information about the contest holders’ tastes. By leveraging this information and 
submitting late, a contestant can increase her probability of winning. In particular, 
when a contestant delays her submission time by one unit, and the maximum star 
rating of other contestants at the time of submission is increased by one unit, the 
contestant will increase her probability of winning the contest by 12.84%. 
Furthermore, by delaying submission of a design by one time unit, and the average 
star rating of others in a contest is increased by one unit, the contestant will increase 




one time unit, and the total number of users given star feedback is increased by one 
unit, the contestant will increase her probability of winning the contest by 10.55%.   
 Regression coefficients for blind contests with feedback in column 5 provide 
anticipated estimates. The regression coefficients for feedback to others are negative 
and significant (βc_maxstar_prior= -0.0896; βc_avgstar_prior = -0.0507; βc_ttlnumuserswithstars_prior = 
-0.1126), implying that the higher the feedback given to others at time of a 
contestants first submission the lower the probability of winning the contest. Yet, in 
contrast to open contests with feedback, I observe that in blind contests, the 
coefficients for the interaction of feedback given to others variables and c_subOrder 
are negative and significant (β (c_maxstar_prior*subOrder) = -0.0054; β(c_avgstar_prior*subOrder)= -
0.0139; β(c_ttlnumuserswithstars_prior*subOrder) = -0.0729), implying that the higher the 
feedback given to others and the later the submission, the lower the probability of 
winning the contest. This finding provides further support for Proposition 2a. Since 
later contestants are not able to benefit from the information spillover of feedback 
given to other contestants, early submitters have a higher chance of winning than late 
submitters by building upon their own work. 
 3.5.2.2 Type of feedback 
 I further analyze how the different types of textual feedback impact outcomes. 
I compare the specificity of the text feedback in open contests and blind contests. In 
open contests, I find that the regression coefficient in column 1 for 
contest_SpecificFdbk is positive and significant (β (contest_SpecificFdbk) = 0.2421), 
implying that the higher the specificity of the feedback to other contestants in a 




interaction of submission order and the specificity of the feedback is positive and 
significant, (β (c_subOrder *contest_SpecificFdbk) = 0.2841), indicating that the later the 
submission and the higher the specificity of the feedback, the higher the likelihood of 
winning the contest - supporting Proposition 2b. Interestingly, the regression 
coefficient for generic feedback is not significant predictor of the outcome of interest.  
 In blind contests, I observe that the regression coefficient in column 5 for 
contest_SpecificFdbk is negative and significant (β (contest_SpecificFdbk) = -0.1052), 
showing that the higher the specificity of the feedback given to others, the lower the 
probability of winning. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of submission 
order and the specificity of the feedback is also negative and significant, (β 
(c_subOrder*contest_SpecificFdbk) = -0.1931), denoting that the later the submission and the 
higher the specificity of the feedback, the lower the likelihood of winning. These 
findings show that specific feedback to other contestants is not very useful to a 
contestant when the designs are not visible. However, the coefficient for generic 
feedback is positive and significant (β (contest_GenericFdbk) = 0.0344), implying that the 
higher the generic feedback given to others, the higher the likelihood of winning for a 
focal contestant. The coefficient for the interaction of submission order and generic 
feedback is negative (β (c_subOrder*contest_GenericFdbk) = -0.2152) suggesting that the earlier 
the submission and the higher the generic level of the feedback, the higher the 
likelihood of winning.  
 When design submissions of others are visible, the more specific the 
feedback, the greater the benefits from information spillovers relating to the feedback; 




increase in the specificity of the feedback to other contestants at the time of a users’ 
first submission in an open contest will lead to a 24.21% increase in her probability of 
winning the contest. However, when design submissions of others are not visible, the 
specific feedback is less valuable to others, and I find no benefit of late submissions. 
In other words, early submissions have a higher likelihood of winning the contest. In 
such blind contests, I find that a one unit increase in generic feedback to other 
contestants at the time of a users’ first submission will lead to a 3.44% increase in her 
probability of winning the contest. These findings highlight the interaction between 
the information spillovers relating to the design and the specificity of feedback and 
how they impact outcomes. 
 3.5.3 Direct Feedback to User   
 I next examine the impact of direct feedback to a contestant and resubmission 
in both open and blind contests with feedback.  
 In open contests with feedback, I find that the regression coefficients in 
column1 on direct feedback are both positive and significant (β (c_maxstars) = 0.0751; β 
(feedback_dum) = 0.0624). Indicating that the higher the star rating feedback of a 
contestant, the higher the probability of winning the contest; and all else being equal, 
contestants that get feedback are more likely to win the contest as compared to 
contestants that do not get feedback. The positive and significant coefficient on the 
total number of resubmission variable (β (c_ttl_resubs) = 0.0557), shows that the higher 
the number of resubmissions, the higher is the likelihood of being a winner. Further 
examining the impact of direct feedback; the regression coefficient for the interaction 




(β (c_maxstars*timeToResubmit) = -0.0976), denoting that the higher the star rating feedback a 
user gets and the earlier the resubmission, the higher is the likelihood of being a 
winner. In addition, the coefficient for the  interaction of total resubmissions and 
feedback dummy is positive and significant (β (c_ttl_resubs*feedback_dum) = 0.0835), 
indicating that users that get feedback and resubmit are more likely to win the contest 
as compared to users that do not get feedback and resubmit  
 Results for blind contests are also similar to open contests. The coefficients in 
column 5 on direct feedback are also both positive and significant (β (c_maxstars) = 
0.2011; β (feedback_dum) = 0.1319), indicating that the higher the feedback a user gets, 
the higher is the likelihood of her winning. Similarly, the positive significant 
coefficient on total resubmissions (β (c_ttl_resubs) = 0.1043), implies that the higher the 
number of resubmissions, the higher is the likelihood of being a winner. The 
interaction coefficient for star feedback and time to resubmit is negative (β 
(c_maxstars*timeToResubmit) = -0.0339), showing that the higher the star rating feedback a 
user gets and the earlier the resubmission, the higher is the likelihood of being a 
winner. Lastly, the interaction coefficient for the total resubmissions and feedback 
dummy is positive and significant (β (c_ttl_resubs*feedback_dum) = 0.1721), denoting that 
users that get feedback and resubmit are more likely to win as compared to users that 
do not get feedback and resubmit  
 I also find that users resubmit when there is no feedback in the contest. In 
open contests with no feedback, the coefficient in column 3 on the total number of 
resubmissions is positive and significant (β (c_ttl_resubs) =0.0089), implying that higher 




feedback, the number of resubmissions is not a significant predictor winning the 
contest. Although there is no information spillover in terms of feedback in open 
contests with no feedback, users are still able to benefit from information spillovers 
relating to the design visibility. Therefore, contestants may resubmit a better design at 
a later stage and increase their likelihood of winning the contest. However, in blind 
contests information spillover relating to the design visibility is not available, and 
thus there is no benefit of resubmission.  
 3.5.4 Skill, Expertise, and Experience 
 In all types of contests, the regression coefficients for all expertise variables 
are positive and significant, implying that winners are more likely to have high skill 
(or high rate of past wins), experience and have expertise in more than one type of 
contest design. Interestingly, in open contests (with and without feedback) where 
designs are visible, the coefficients for the interaction of c_subOrder and expertise 
variables are positive and significant, showing that contestants that submit late and 
have high skill, design expertise, or experience, are more likely to be winners. 
However, in blind contests with feedback, the coefficients for the interaction of 
c_subOrder and expertise variables are negative, indicating that contestants that 
submit early and have high skill, design expertise or experience are more likely to be 
winners. However, when there is no feedback spillover in blind contests (blind with 
no feedback), I do not find any significant results for the interaction of subOrder and 
expertise variables on the probability of winning the contest. Taken together, when 
there is design and feedback spillover, the more skilled and experience contestants are 




win. However, in the case of blind contests with feedback, when there is no design 
visibility, high skilled contestants who submit early are more likely to win. These 
results show that it is the contestants with higher skills, experience, and expertise that 
are more likely to act strategically and win the contest.  
 3.5.5 Controls 
 Results for the control variables align very well with expectations and are 
consistent with the results. For all types of contests, the regression coefficients for 
total contest entries, contest prize amount, contest description length, contest holders 
average feedback and contest holder total prizes awarded are negative and significant. 
More entries, a higher prize, a more detailed description, a more attractive contest 
holder all imply competition, and therefore negatively impact the probability of 
winning a contest. As expected, the coefficient of a member’s age is positive and 
significant, showing that contestants that have been in the online marketplace for 
longer have a higher probability of winning the contest.  
 3.5.6 Robustness Checks   
 To ensure the robustness of my findings, I conducted a series of additional 
tests. In this section, I present multiple robustness checks that address selection bias, 
qualitative surveys to contest holders, brief informal contestant interviews, and 
additional specifications to ensure the vigor of my findings. 
 3.5.6.1 Selection Bias 
 An issue of concern is whether there is selection bias in terms of contestants’ 
choice in selecting an open versus a blind contest. I use a t-test to test the difference 




choice of open contest and blind contests. I find no significant difference in either 
skill p =0.203; experience p = 0.186; expertise p = 0.843; or member age p = 0.102, 
indicating no self-selection bias in choice of open versus blind contests relating to 
these variables. 
 In addition, I examine whether or not contest holders choose open versus 
blind contests in terms of whether they have observed any type of participation 
selection by designers. For example, whether or not contest holders have observed 
that more “effortful” or more “skilled” designers participate in blind contests as 
opposed to open contests. Given the information spillover and imitation findings, by 
blinding the contest, one would think that it would attract designers that would put 
more “effort,” and, thereby, might require a higher reward. Therefore, I use a t-test to 
test the difference of means of contest prize amount for contest holders that held both 
open and blind contests. On average open contests have a lower prize amounts than 
blind contests (open = $537.6704, open = $304.9263; blind = $615.1873, blind = 
$344.3936), however I accept the null hypothesis that the means are the same and 
find no significant difference (p = 0.1405). This findings shows that contest holders 
do not provide different rewards for open versus blind contests.  
 3.5.6.2 Contest Holder Surveys and Informal Contestant Interviews 
 I conducted an online survey of contest holders and an informal brief online 
interview of a few designers to better understand their behaviors and choices in this 
marketplace.  
 To better understand why contest holders would choose to hold an open 




on the contest holders. Figure 3.12a shows the survey email sent, and Figure 3.12b 
displays the actual survey.  
 As for the sample I surveyed, I initially went through the contest holders in 
my sample and gathered any email information they had made public. I also went on 
the design community Facebook Page and Twitter account and collected contact 
information on users that had made comments as contest holders.  In all, I collected 
contact information on 270 contest holders. 
 I contacted contest holders via email, Facebook private message or Twitter 
private message. I got responses from 32 contest holders, 64% of which had 
conducted both open and blind contests, and the rest had only held open contests. I 
find that contest holders sometimes have an idea of the design they want at the time, 
but at other times they do not.  
 In terms of understanding why contest holders chose one type of contest over 
another, I asked them about the advantage of holding one type of contest over 
another. As for open contests versus blind contests, most respondents (63%) indicated 
that there is more participation and visibility in open contests. One respondent 
indicated that it attracts designers from outside of the community. Interestingly some 
pointed out that designers learn from each other or “Designers piggy back on each 
other when I give feedback, makes it simpler for me and we get to the design faster.” 
This is a thought provoking comment, that some contest holders not only have 
noticed that designers imitate via feedback, but also they actually prefer the 
imitation/learning that occurs because it is easier and faster for them.  One respondent 




good when I have a pretty good idea of the logo design I want.” This comment 
suggests that some contest holders prefer open contests when they have an idea in 
mind, such that designers build upon each other through the feedback.   
 As for the advantage of blind contests over open contests, most of the contest 
holders denoted that the privacy of the logo designs seems to be the main advantage 
(78%). Some of the contest holders specified that there is “no design imitation and 
more variety of designs” in blind contests as opposed to open contests. This comment 
shows that blinding the designs resulted in more varied submissions.   
 Remarkably, all respondents noticed that in open contests later submissions 
were sometimes similar to earlier submissions. However, this did not seem to happen 
in blind contests. This supports the finding that users that submit later benefit from 
the information spillovers.  
 All respondents provided feedback in their contests. While 33% of them wait 
for a certain number of submissions before providing feedback, and 19% wait a few 
days before providing feedback, 48% provide feedback as soon as they see a 
potentially good design. This indicates that feedback can be generalized to all (when 
they wait for a certain number of submissions) or can be more specific such as when 
they see a potentially good design. Fifty-six percent of respondents provide feedback 
to the top 2-3 submissions, 26% to the best submission only, and 18% to the top 4-5 
submissions. This shows that while some contest holders focus on a particular best 
submission, a lot of contest holders prefer keeping their options open by providing 
feedback to more submissions. The main reason behind providing feedback is to 




holders suggested the reason was to attract more submissions (26%). All respondents 
indicated that (a) they saw more submissions from other contestants upon providing 
feedback, (b) they got a better design from the contestants they provided feedback to 
and (c) feedback also benefits other contestants who submitted after the feedback. 
These findings strongly support our finding that users that submit later benefit from 
feedback given to others.  Overall, the survey provided further support for my 
findings relating to information spillover and timing of submissions. 
 To better understand who the designers are and their submission strategy, I 
informally interviewed a few designers. I contacted seven designers that had a high 
number of wins via private message and was able to get response from four of them. 
Figure 3.13 displays the responses. Three out of the four designers were located 
outside of the US. Only one designer considered the design community to be that 
designer’s sole source of income; the rest used the community as a hobby and as a 
way to augment their income.  
 In terms of choice of what contests to join, most of them seem to want a 
contest that is “interesting” to them. One designer preferred open contests; another 
preferred contests above $300. The clarity of the design brief was also important to 
one. A couple of designers also noted that an active contest holder that provides 
feedback attracted them.  
 Lastly, to get an understanding of their submission strategy, I asked them if 
they had a preference as to when to submit their first design. While two designers 
preferred early submission to get feedback, the other two preferred to wait and submit 




first two days.  In particular, both designers that preferred late submission wanted to 
wait for “participation from others” and wait for the contest holder to give a rating or 
feedback to get a better idea of what “he is after”.   
 3.5.6.3 Additional Specifications 
 To further validate my findings, I estimated alternative model specifications. I 
ran a two stage random effects model as shown in Table 3.4 using the same fixed 
effects IV’s as instruments.  Most applications in economics have made the choice 
between the random effects and fixed effects estimators based on the standard 
Hausman test (1978). The null hypothesis of the Hausman is that the preferred model 
is random effects versus fixed effects. This test basically tests whether the 
disturbances are correlated with the regressors, and the null hypothesis is they are not. 
Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the fixed effects model is consistent and the 
random effects model is inconsistent. I therefore run the Hausman test and find that 
the null hypothesis is rejected (chi2 = 26.34; Prob>chi2 = 0.0005). Therefore I am 
more confident in my fixed effects models.  
 I also estimated a Probit and a Logit model for the probability of winning the 
contest. Furthermore, I estimated at a two stage Probit with IV using the same 
instrumental variables (average submission order and average star rating).  All three 
models provided highly consistent results in terms of sign and significance.  
3.6 Conclusions and Implications 
The massive growth and consumption of Web 2.0 has transformed and redefined the 
roles of traditional ways of conducting business by proficiently bringing together 




corporation. Web 2.0 connects firms with new emerging online marketplaces that 
allow them to tap into the wisdom of crowds for resources and solutions. Recently, 
firms have been using such emerging crowdsourcing open innovation marketplaces at 
an escalated rate (for example, Mountain Dew, AOL, Starbucks, Dell). According to 
data from fourteen large crowdsourcing firms, their revenues grew 53% between 
2009 and 2010, and 74% between 2010 and 2011(Silverman, 2012). These open 
innovation marketplaces have made visible, information that was traditionally not 
only costly, but also impossible to provide in contests prior Web 2.0. Such 
information relates to contestants’ submissions and feedback from the contest holder - 
not only to the user but to others in the contest. While advances in Web 2.0 are 
creating new opportunities for firms to find solutions they also entail new challenges. 
Traditional managerial actions are no longer appropriate in these new emerging 
marketplaces. My study seeks to be one of the first attempts to understand the role of 
information spillover in different contest designs on the behavior of contestants as 
well as contest outcomes. 
 From a theoretical perspective, my study complements and extends the 
emerging literature on online crowdsourcing markets and in particular on the design 
of online contests. This study is among the first to empirically examine the role of 
different information visibility regimes on the behavior of contestants as well as 
contest outcomes in online settings. My study also contributes to the vast stream of 
research on the role of timing of entry and its implications for market outcomes. Most 
of the studies examining the timing of entry of market participants examine the 




entry behavior of individuals in a decentralized marketplace. My study also 
complements and extends the literature in IS that has studied the impact of IT-related 
information spillovers on firms and industries (for example, Brynjolffson & Hitt, 
2000; Chang & Gurbaxani, 2012; Mun & Nadiri, 2002; Cheng & Nault, 2007). In 
particular, I empirically extend literature on timing of entry, and information spillover 
in the context of open innovation marketplaces at the individual level. In this study, I 
show that information spillover is a crucial factor in determining the optimal time of 
entry. First mover advantages have been known to benefit firms in terms of market 
share, profitability and long terms effects. However, when it comes to the open 
innovation contest marketplace, I find that information spillover in certain contest 
designs diminishes the well-known competitive strategy of first movers, and thus 
benefits late movers instead. 
 My findings not only give access to a richer theoretical understanding of the 
role of information visibility regimes, but also ways through which one might 
ultimately increase the effectiveness contest designs in open innovation marketplaces. 
The results of this study offer some interesting implications for firms in managing 
open innovation marketplaces.  
 This study is conducted on a leading online open innovation marketplace for 
designs, and present important new results on how different information visibility 
regimes impacts user behavior and contest outcomes. I compare “open” contests 
possessing greater degrees of information transparency with “blind” contests that 
have limited information transparency, and examine how these different information 




 I find that contest design, particularly relating to information visibility, 
significantly influences contestant’s behavior as well as outcomes. Information 
spillover on design visibility has econometrically identifiable impacts on contestant’s 
behavior and contest outcome. Technology providers in such crowdsourcing 
marketplace should be aware of such behavior under different information 
transparency regimes and design the market accordingly. I also find evidence of 
informational spillovers relating to feedback given to others. Technology providers of 
such open innovation marketplaces should be mindful of the potential impact of 
making feedback visible on user behavior. Technology is evolving at a fast pace, and 
thus it is crucial to take appropriate action in terms of designing the market. In 
particular, information spillover induces imitation, and imitation lowers the diversity 
of ideas, which is associated with lower innovation (Terwiesch and Ulrich, 2009). I 
recommend “blind”-ing contests for when the contest holder is looking for diversity 
of designs and innovative designs. Yet when the contest holder has a fair idea in 
mind, then an “open” contest would allow contestants to learn from each other and 
deliver the best solution to the contest holder. Another recommendation would be a 
multi-stage contest. The contest could start as “blind”   to deliver the most diverse 
ideas. Once the contest holder likes a submission, she can then turn the contest to an 
“open” contest for designers to learn from each other and deliver the optimal solution.  
In order to maintain the attractiveness of the market, operators should provide such 
options to the contest holder to maintain the effectiveness of the marketplace.   
 Another novel finding is the benefits from informational spillovers differ 




with feedback, the more specific the feedback given to others in a contest, the higher 
the chances of late submissions winning the contest. However, in blind contests 
where users cannot see each other’s submissions, specific feedback given to other 
contestants does not benefit a focal user, while generic feedback increases the 
likelihood of late submissions winning the contest. In order to encourage delivery of 
optimal submissions, market operators should therefore manage the content in the text 
feedback. Market operators should encourage contest holders to provide specific 
feedback in open contests, and generic feedback in blind contests to facilitate better 
communication between the contest holder and the contestants and improve the 
overall performance of a contest.  
  These results highlight the importance of the role of different information 
regimes and information spillover in open innovation contests on time to entry and 
ultimately the probability winning the contest. The findings of this study draw 
attention to the fact that with the increase in information visibility online, technology 
providers and contest designers should alter their ways to manage the visibility of 
information more proficiently. The findings of my study would guide platform 
developers to enable and constrain the visibility of information that operates in their 
ecosystem and would engineer the user experience to increase the efficiency of the 
marketplace.  
3.7 Limitations and Future Research 
My study has certain limitations. Although this study controlled for experience and 
expertise of the designers, I was not able to collect designer demographic 




potentially impact outcomes. While the fixed effects models used in this study 
accounted for omitted variable bias, future studies can replicate this study and control 
for such demographic information.  
 Although it is abundantly clear that strategic behavior is present, the precise 
mechanism through which strategic behavior exerts itself in this specific context is 
less understood. I identified information spillover and its different types as a 
possibility, but there may be others, and my analysis does not allow me to distinguish 
between them. More qualitative data via interviews or surveys may shed further light 
on this issue. In addition, future studies can also survey designers to further 
investigate whether designers learn specific types of strategies with time and whether 
their strategies change overtime. 
 This study identified when winners are more likely to submit in different 
contest design regimes. However, I cannot suggest that a solver should take a late or 
early approach in particular, as it entails confounding effects on contestants such as 
the amount of time spent to deliver a solution. Yet, from a contest holder point of 
view, knowing when they will receive the best solutions is what they are most 
interested in. Future studies can explore the factors that will expedite the arrivals of 
best solutions.   
 My analysis of the textual comments is one of the first efforts to study the 
effect of written language feedback on strategic behavior of contestants. Though I 
identified the main feedback categories of text (specific versus generic), future studies 
could apply advanced text mining techniques to possibly identify more advanced text 




potentially change how contestants react in different contest visibility regimes. These 
are certainly interesting dynamic interactions that can be explored in future. 
 Lastly, since this study was limited to a single open innovation marketplace 
for a specific logo contest, additional corroboration of these novel findings by 
subsequent research that examine multiple crowdsourcing markets would be useful. 
This is especially so as the imitation costs of different types of contests and the 
amount of information visibility is likely to be contingent on the nature of the contest 





























Chapter 4: Conclusion 
As the digitization of online markets continues to grow, it also presents novel 
opportunities and challenges in terms of designing marketplaces. In particular, the 
increased visibility of information enabled by Web 2.0 technologies has led to an 
explosion of new business models that seek to leverage this increased availability of 
information. One type of information that has become very salient is information 
about “others” in an individual’s network or market. This sudden increase in the 
amount and variety of information available to an individual about others in her 
network is likely to have significant impact on her behaviors and choices.  
My dissertation examines the impact of increased information transparency, 
and in particular information on other users in the community, on an individual’s 
behavior in two different online emerging marketplaces. The first essay compares and 
contrasts the value of “social” information with “non-social” information and how 
they impact different outcomes in one of the largest online social media platforms--
Facebook. The second essay examines the role of informational spillovers in open 
innovation design contests, in an online crowdsourcing market wherein firms seek 
design solutions from a crowd. A better understanding of the increase of visibility of 
information impact on consumer behavior in this emerging landscape has 
implications for academics, policymakers, and entrepreneurs who seek to leverage the 
power of online markets. 
The findings of my dissertation add to the streams of literature that study 
social influence, information spillover and time-to-market. Essay 1 provides evidence 




making process, in particular, in alleviating the negative impacts of the 
advertisements, and in its essential role as a new mechanism for advertisements. The 
study also empirically shows that it is fruitful to examine how different types of 
“social information” interact with media interactivity, to impact marketing 
effectiveness at the consumer level. In contrast to the general notion that marketing 
methods are more effective at promoting product diffusion when the interactivity is 
active; I find that passive interactivity coupled with “social” marketing fosters virality 
more globally than active “social” methods. This essay takes a step towards 
understanding how a consumer can be used in the marketing campaign as a “co-
creator” of value for the firm. Understanding optimal viral marketing design 
strategies enables firms to optimally create and manage social contagion. Essay 2 
provides empirical evidence on the role of information spillover in determining the 
timing of entry at the consumer level. While first mover advantages have been known 
to benefit firms, the study finds that information spillover in certain contest designs 
diminishes the well-known competitive strategy of first movers, and benefits late 
movers instead. The study also highlights how transparency of information in 
different contest design regimes may lead to imitation, which may potentially limit 
the innovativeness and competitiveness of the marketplace. In order to maintain the 
attractiveness of the market for innovation seekers as well as designers, market 
operators must understand the implications of different contest designs and 
information regimes to enable the design of an optimal innovative marketplace.  
In conclusion, the two essays of my dissertation provide a better 




“co-creators” of value to the firm, and how this role impacts user behavior and 
outcomes in emerging online marketplaces. The essays from this dissertation seek to 
inform firms and policy makers in designing better ways to interact with consumers 
through managing the transparency of information on “others”. Marketplaces that 
learn to utilize the power of information in an optimal way will be better positioned to 
succeed. Further developments in internet technologies and Web 2.0 will continue to 
change the salience of information visibility in emerging marketplaces, creating a rich 
area for future empirical research. While this dissertation takes an initial step, future 
research should examine how consumers respond to changes in information visibility 
of online communities.  Lastly, my dissertation contributes to the growing IS 
literature of empirical studies in online markets, especially those related to online 























Appendices for Essay 1 
Figure 2.1 Facebook Ad Revenues 
 
 
  Notes: Print screen adapted from:  




Figure 2.2 Social Ad 
 




Figure 2.3 Advertising Information Sources 
 
 Active Passive 
Non-Social Email Traditional Ad 
Social Friend Invite  Newsfeed 






























Table 2.1 Adoption Source Frequency Distribution 
 
Adoption Source Frequency Percent 
Traditional Ad 86,057 30.97 
Social Ad 13,211 4.75 
Email 12,222 4.40 
Invited by Friend 21,108 7.60 
Newsfeed 81,704 29.40 





Table 2.2 Overall Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
App Activity 
    ln_passenger_count 0.3803 0.6016 0 5.6904 
ln_pilot_count 0.4792 0.5263 0 3.2958 
ln_stories 0.1687 0.3740 0 5.2781 
ln_photos 0.0295 0.2147 0 5.3375 
App Diffusion     
Diameter 0.5179 0.9635 0 9 
Outdegree 0.2128 0.6962 0 24 
Size_of_CC 1.7920 2.1205 1 35 
Network App Controls     
friend_count 1.4014 3.7665 0 227 
thresholddaily_percOfFriendsLike 0.0159 0.3356 0 39 
App Adoption Controls     
day_lvl_adop 20.5326 11.2807 1 44 
Facebook Privacy Controls 
    ln_ttl_privacy 1.5385 0.1550 0.6931 1.6094 
Facebook Activity Controls 
    likes_count 15.3578 16.1432 0 1438 
num_of_friends_onFB 299.9410 309.2102 1 4985 
Facebook Likes/Interests Categories Count 
    fbc_interests 0.6187 1.4241 0 9 
fbc_activities 0.6154 0.8653 0 4 
fbc_television 1.6549 2.0781 0 10 
fbc_sports 0.0563 0.2938 0 3 
fbc_movies 1.1886 1.7609 0 10 
fbc_other 7.7900 7.8954 0 1413 
fbc_music 1.8198 2.1521 0 10 
fbc_favorite_teams 0.2763 0.8895 0 9 
fbc_favorite_athletes 0.2879 0.9575 0 7 
fbc_games 0.1692 0.7710 0 5 






Table 2.3 Top 10 CC Sub-Sample Adoption Distribution 
 
Distribution of users that liked the App Count Percentage 
User & 1
st
 degree Friend only 680 58% 
User & 2
nd





 degree Friend 364 31% 







Table 2.4 Sample Construction Summary 
 
Sample Total users that 
“Like”-d App 
Total users that 
did not “Like” 
App 
Additions to 
sample from the 
Outcome Sample-  
users that “Like”-




FanPage 1294 3914 3000 8202 
Top10CC 1174 102606 173,050 (All) 275082 











Table 2.5 Variables and Description 
 
 Category Variable Description 
Outcome 
Variables 
App Adoption user_Adopted Dummy variable – whether or not 
user adopted 
 App Use ln_passengered_count Log of the number of instances of 
the App where user is a passenger. 
  ln_photos_uploaded Log of the number of photos 
uploaded to App by user. User 
Generated Content (UGC). 
  ln_stories_uploaded Log of the number of stories 
uploaded to App by user. User 
Generated Content (UGC). 
 App Diffusion ln_diameter Log of the Diameter of the 
connected component of the user. A 
measure of beyond local diffusion or 
diffusion reach. 
  ln_outdegree Log of the Number of invitations 




Social Exposure FirstDegree Total First Degree Friends /Total 
number of Facebook Friends that 
had adopted the App at time of user 
adoption decision 
  SecondDegree Total Second Degree Friends /Total 
number of Facebook Friends that 




source_email The source the user came to like the 
App from: 
Email Source 
  source_ad Traditional ad 
  source_socialad Social ad 
  source_invited Facebook friend invitation 
  source_nf Facebook newsfeed 
   Other – came directly to the App, 
not through online advertising. This 
is the baseline and not included in 
the analysis. 
Controls Facebook 
Privacy Level  
ln_ttl_privacy Whether the user allows such 






Facebook default policy all of the 
below should be allowed). Log of 
the Total count of  : 
● Ability to “Send a 
Message” 
● Ability to “Add user as 
Friend” 
 Friend App 
Activity Control 
frnd_avg_passenger Average number of Passengers for 
users’ friends. 
  frnd_avg_pilot Average number of Pilots for users’ 
friends. 
  frnd_avg_photos Average number of Photos for 
users’ friends. 
  frnd_avg_stories Average number of Stories for 
users’ friends. 
 Network App 
Controls 
friend_count Number of friends who have liked 
the App at time of adoption for the 
user. 
  Percoffrndadopters Percentage of Facebook Friends that 
liked the App. 
  thresholddaily_percOfFr
iendsLike 
(Day of Adoption – Max Friend 
Adoption Day)* (number of friends 
that liked the App) / (Total Number 
of facebook friends) 
 Facebook 
Activity 
likes_count Total Number of Likes and 
Activities on Facebook. 
  num_of_FBFriends Total number of Facebook Friends 
  fbc_ Count of likes on Facebook on the 
following Categories : Interests, 
Activities, Television, Sports, 
Movies, Music, Favorite  Teams, 
Favorite Athletes, Games, Books, 
Other 
 Adoption Rate 
Controls 
day_lvl_adop Day when the user “Liked” the App, 
according to the lifetime of the App. 
 Demographic 
Controls 
Gender Facebook listed Gender 









Expedia Fan Page 
(2) 
Expedia Fan Page 
(3) 
Top 10 CC 
 
(4) 





















FirstDeg_FrndAdop 0.5283*** 1.1581*** 0.5032*** 1.2374*** 0.4731*** 1.1921*** 
 
(0.0934) (0.1461) (0.0562) (0.1112) (0.1301) (0.2102) 
SecondDeg_FrndAdop 0.1003*** 1.1001*** 0.0617*** 1.0847*** 0.1047*** 1.0619*** 
 
(0.0173) (0.1065) (0.0032) (0.9383) (0.0254) (0.1106) 
FirstDeg*SecondDeg 0.5301*** 1.1613*** 0.5918*** 1.1389*** 0.5027*** 1.1898*** 
 
(0.1145) (0.2012) (0.0953) (0.4172) (0.1343) (0.2312) 
Female 0.3598*** 1.2566*** 0.3806*** 1.1981* 0.2307*** 1.1692*** 
 
(0.0371) (0.0431) (0.0281) (0.0968) (0.0567) (0.0627) 
numofFBFriends 0.0028 1.0040 0.0053 1.0067 0.0014 1.0026 
 
(0.1039) (0.0180) (0.1748) (0.0991) (0.1276) (0.0176) 
location_GB 0.3754 1.2031 0.3330 1.2507 0.4538 1.2712 
 
(0.1923) (0.2312) (0.7213) (0.1717) (0.2109) (0.6658) 
location_US 0.2728 1.2071 0.4523 1.2993 0.1029 1.2018 
 
(0.1803) (0.1692) (0.6377) (0.1577) (0.2130) (0.3109) 
ttl_privacy 1.0226 1.0971 -0.5171 0.9677 -0.3021 0.8291 
 
(0.7515) (0.1738) (0.4170) (0.1610) (0.4321) (0.2610) 
likes_count 0.0005*** 1.0153*** 0.0009*** 1.0773*** 0.0007*** 1.0020*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0135) (0.0000) (0.0178) (0.0002) (0.0125) 
fbc_interests 0.0077 1.0059 -0.1635 0.8541 -0.0054 0.9102 
 
(0.0800) (0.0634) (0.3169) (0.5288) (0.0042) (0.0167) 
fbc_activities -0.1072 0.9158 -0.9324 0.6604 -0.1025 0.8994 
 
(0.1109) (0.0760) (0.6543) (0.1647) (0.1175) (0.0925) 
fbc_television 0.1399 1.0205 -0.2824 0.9204 0.1053 1.0179 
 




fbc_movies -0.0357 0.9984 0.9247 1.0595 -0.0401 0.9711 
 
(0.1005) (0.0659) (0.6963) (0.0463) (0.1023) (0.0463) 
fbc_other -0.0183 0.9899 -0.2168 0.2176 -0.2299 0.4291 
 
(0.0151) (0.0523) (0.1745) (0.1172) (0.1039) (0.0739) 
fbc_music -0.1868 0.9464 0.8218 1.0160 -0.2031 0.8721 
 
(0.1652) (0.0612) (0.5243) (0.0389) (0.3145) (0.0892) 
fbc_favorites 0.0273 1.0297 -0.7908 0.8417 0.0207 1.0077 
 
(0.1275) (0.0848) (0.8190) (0.1471) (0.1069) (0.0947) 
fbc_sports -0.4300 0.9486 -0.4722 0.8393 -0.5572 0.7638 
 
(0.2846) (0.1499) (0.3293) (0.1155) (0.4419) (0.2311) 
fbc_games -0.3239 0.9834 -0.7349 0.8585 -0.6213 0.8183 
 
(0.1952) (0.0782) (0.1004) (0.1028) (0.1736) (0.1736) 
fbc_books -0.0995 0.9700 -0.9612 0.8876 -0.0319 0.9321 
 
(0.1110) (0.0626) (0.8508) (0.4306) (0.4109) (0.2377) 
MediaExposure 0.0108*** 1.0037*** 0.0130*** 1.0510*** 0.0132*** 1.0238*** 
 




























Ll  -4685.0873  -4386.9960  -4619.4312 
Notes: This table reports parameter estimates and standard errors of the first stage of the Heckman model and the Hazard model as specified in Section 2.4 for 
App adoption for all three samples (1) FanPage ,(2)Top10CC, and (3) Intersection.  A Heckman first stage is a Probit model predicting the probability of App 
adoption.  The table also reports hazards ratio estimates of a Cox proportional hazards model of the time to App adoption. A hazards ratio greater than 1.0 for 
variable x indicates that it increases the probability of App adoption, while a ratio less than 1.0 indicates that it decreases the probability of App adoption. 



















Top 10 CC 
(5) 
Top 10 CC 
(6) 


























source_ad -0.0063*** -0.1791*** -0.1534*** -0.0124*** -0.2164*** -0.1623*** -0.0109*** -0.1607*** -0.1363*** 
 
(0.0012) (0.0209) (0.0295) (0.0005) (0.0234) (0.0317) (0.0028) (0.0324) (0.0377) 
source_email -0.0816*** -0.0268* -0.0051*** -0.0843*** -0.0290*** -0.0086*** -0.1251*** -0.0313** -0.0081*** 
 
(0.0179) (0.0142) (0.0012) (0.0162) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0284) (0.0151) (0.0023) 
source_invited 0.3530*** 0.2559*** 0.1214*** 0.3300*** 0.2549*** 0.2301*** 0.2449*** 0.2561*** 0.2079*** 
 
(0.0477) (0.0274) (0.0419) (0.0332) (0.0491) (0.0044) (0.0603) (0.0712) (0.0427) 
source_nf 0.5492*** 0.1761*** 0.0759*** 0.3628*** 0.1396*** 0.1760*** 0.4224*** 0.1228** 0.1375** 
 
(0.0593) (0.0457) (0.0194) (0.0120) (0.0421) (0.0310) (0.1242) (0.0467) (0.0618) 
source_socialad 0.4636*** 0.1390*** 0.0680*** 0.3357*** 0.0252*** 0.0683*** 0.3196*** 0.1015*** 0.0729*** 
 
(0.0357) (0.0122) (0.0101) (0.0511) (0.0083) (0.0211) (0.0719) (0.0257) (0.0161) 
ln_ttl_privacy 0.2092*** -0.0616*** -0.0569*** 0.3264*** -0.1408*** -0.0277*** 0.1866*** -0.0851*** -0.0114*** 
 
(0.0175) (0.0168) (0.0115) (0.0587) (0.0417) (0.0068) (0.0485) (0.0176) (0.0034) 
Female -0.0370*** 0.1505*** 0.0650 -0.0512*** 0.1563*** 0.0448*** -0.0501*** 0.0666*** 0.0628*** 
 
(0.0058) (0.0135) (0.0649) (0.0091) (0.0317) (0.0108) (0.0068) (0.0146) (0.0134) 
location_GB 0.1897 0.1821 0.0004 0.4231** 0.2967*** 0.1307*** 0.1045** 0.0492 0.0150 
 
(0.1634) (0.1824) (0.1783) (0.1519) (0.0457) (0.0425) (0.0503) (0.0467) (0.1206) 
location_US 0.1014*** 0.1713*** 0.1351*** 0.1493*** 0.1429*** 0.1436*** 0.1604*** 0.1327*** 0.1324*** 
 
(0.0259) (0.0252) (0.0332) (0.0132) (0.0185) (0.0122) (0.0272) (0.0333) (0.0379) 
FirstDeg_FrndA
dop 
0.4192*** 0.3393*** 0.0468*** 0.4783*** 0.3279*** 0.0384*** 0.3901*** 0.3137*** 0.0417*** 
 
(0.0861) (0.0926) (0.0107) (0.0348) (0.0467) (0.0032) (0.0928) (0.0937) (0.0121) 
SecDeg_FrndA
dop 





(0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
First*Second_F
rndAdop 
0.2809*** 0.2523*** 0.2450*** 0.1604*** 0.1369*** 0.1660*** 0.2310*** 0.2181*** 0.1807*** 
 
(0.0314) (0.0401) (0.0496) (0.0431) (0.0476) (0.0203) (0.0445) (0.0507) (0.0533) 
num_ofFB_frie
nds 
0.0000*** -0.0001**** 0.0001*** -0.0008*** -0.0000*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0001* 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
threshold_percF
riendAdop 
-0.2927*** -0.0776*** -0.1297*** -0.2448*** -0.2168*** -0.1250*** -0.2153*** -0.1024*** -0.1229*** 
 
(0.0322) (0.0228) (0.0311) (0.0163) (0.0532) (0.0315) (0.0589) (0.0258) (0.0328) 
likes_count 0.0052*** 0.0033*** 0.0052*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0052*** 0.0028*** 0.0041*** 
 
(0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
fbc_interests 0.0137*** 0.0132*** 0.0078*** 0.0145*** 0.0300*** 0.0074*** 0.0154*** 0.0130*** 0.0075*** 
 
(0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0086) (0.0003) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0015) 
fbc_activities 0.0108** 0.0255*** 0.0236*** 0.0867*** 0.2013*** 0.0202*** 0.0250*** 0.0346*** 0.0268*** 
 
(0.0049) (0.0057) (0.0031) (0.0064) (0.0612) (0.0006) (0.0075) (0.0100) (0.0072) 
fbc_tv 0.0491 -0.0150 -0.0318 0.1924*** 0.0670*** 0.0031*** 0.0053 0.0163** 0.0385* 
 
(0.0461) (0.0492) (0.0479) (0.0432) (0.0206) (0.0008) (0.0044) (0.0068) (0.0202) 
fbc_sports -0.0781 -0.0943 -0.0284 -0.1961 -0.1474*** 0.006 -0.0156 -0.0087 -0.0496 
 
(0.0929) (0.0987) (0.0962) (0.1410) (0.0268) (0.0130) (0.0107) (0.0219) (0.0567) 
fbc_movies -0.0049 -0.0163 -0.0138 -0.1847*** -0.0536*** -0.0003 -0.0594** -0.0086*** -0.0022 
 
(0.0436) (0.0464) (0.0452) (0.0640) (0.0108) (0.0004) (0.0215) (0.0018) (0.0032) 
fbc_other 0.0283*** -0.0233*** -0.0209*** 0.0081*** -0.0075*** -0.0022*** 0.0052** -0.0075** -0.0051*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0048) (0.0039) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0012) 
fbc_music 0.0286*** 0.0089*** 0.0177*** 0.0244*** 0.0088*** 0.0164*** 0.0190*** 0.0080** 0.0156*** 
 
(0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
fbc_fav_teams 0.0258*** 0.0231** 0.0213*** 0.0278*** 0.0296*** 0.0188*** 0.0207** 0.0260** 0.0191*** 
 
(0.0068) (0.0098) (0.0039) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0045) (0.0089) (0.0093) (0.0042) 





(0.0093) (0.0044) (0.0259) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0207) (0.0073) (0.0045) (0.0299) 
fbc_games 0.0112** -0.0145*** -0.0527** 0.0145** -0.0181*** -0.0522*** 0.0185** -0.0104* -0.0589** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0221) (0.0053) (0.0037) (0.0154) (0.0070) (0.0057) (0.0239) 
fbc_books -0.0212 0.0250 -0.0556 0.0672*** -0.0193*** -0.0268*** -0.0052 0.0043 -0.0212 
 
(0.0444) (0.0472) (0.0459) (0.0130) (0.0056) (0.0073) (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0179) 
day_lvl_adop -0.0065*** -0.0101*** -0.0084*** -0.0078*** -0.0114*** -0.0071*** -0.0067*** -0.0117*** -0.0072*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
frnd_avg_pilot 0.0124* -0.1757 -0.0179 0.0159*** 0.0080* -0.0038 0.0191** -0.0246 -0.0014 
 
(0.0065) (0.1541) (0.1504) (0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0023) (0.0076) (0.0332) (0.0219) 
frnd_avg_passe
nger 
0.0025*** 0.1395 0.2627 0.0020*** 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0024** 0.0055 0.0369 
 
(0.0005) (0.1636) (0.1596) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0401) (0.1210) 
frnd_avg_photo 0.0023 0.0017 0.0093* 0.0017 0.0013 0.0139* 0.0064 0.0151 0.0125* 
 
(0.0358) (0.0372) (0.0055) (0.0098) (0.0037) (0.0075) (0.0189) (0.0168) (0.0072) 
frnd_avg_storie
s 
0.0421 0.0201* 0.0002 -0.0094 0.0173* -0.0006 0.0155 0.0217* -0.0003 
 
(0.0301) (0.0105) (0.0024) (0.0106) (0.0098) (0.0040) (0.0250) (0.0111) (0.0039) 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
0.0469*** 0.0731*** 0.0273*** 0.0167*** 0.0314*** 0.0461*** 0.0313*** 0.0954*** 0.0332*** 
 
(0.0085) (0.0102) (0.0079) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0012) (0.0109) (0.0147) (0.0097) 
_cons 0.2320*** 0.0704*** 0.4757*** 0.3411** 0.3074*** 0.0338** 0.2873*** 0.1891*** 0.3800*** 
 
(0.0360) (0.0216) (0.0338) (0.1329) (0.0254) (0.0123) (0.0590) (0.0563) (0.0386) 
N 8208 8208 8208 275082 275082 275082 787 787 787 
Notes: This table reports parameter estimates and standard errors of the second stage of the Heckman model as specified in Section 2.4 for App use outcomes (1) 
Log(Passenger), (2) Log(Stories), and (3) Log(Photos) for all three samples (1) FanPage , (2)Top10CC, and (3) Intersection.   

















Top 10 CC 
(4) 


















ln_total_activity 0.1698*** 0.2398*** 0.2275*** 0.1795*** 0.1832*** 0.2282*** 
 
(0.0180) (0.0219) (0.0226) (0.0206) (0.0199) (0.0230) 
source_ad -0.0817 -0.0313 -0.0882 -0.0255 -0.0831 -0.0382 
 
(0.0580) (0.0418) (0.0593) (0.2156) (0.0595) (0.0203) 
source_email 0.0662 0.0586 -0.0639 0.0512 -0.0538 0.0531 
 
(0.0826) (0.0906) (0.1578) (0.0466) (0.0321) (0.0336) 
source_invited 0.1565*** 0.4959*** 0.0903*** 0.5086*** 0.1725*** 0.4673*** 
 
(0.0134) (0.0891) (0.0061) (0.0460) (0.0142) (0.0912) 
source_nf 0.3138*** 0.1277*** 0.3596*** 0.3603*** 0.3339*** 0.1588*** 
 
(0.0370) (0.0294) (0.0257) (0.0736) (0.0516) (0.0366) 
source_socialad 0.2104*** 0.0598*** 0.2299*** 0.0640*** 0.2369*** 0.0496*** 
 
(0.0558) (0.0146) (0.0399) (0.0034) (0.0595) (0.0151) 
ln_ttl_privacy -0.0505*** -0.0942*** -0.0474*** -0.0828*** -0.0488*** -0.0808*** 
 
(0.0113) (0.0203) (0.0041) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0227) 
Female 0.0289*** 0.0525*** 0.0348*** 0.0587*** 0.0365*** 0.0551*** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0111) (0.0047) (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0157) 
location_GB 0.0849*** 0.1644*** 0.0748*** 0.1877 *** 0.0796* 0.1415* 
 
(0.0131) (0.0563) (0.0109) (0.0415) (0.0411) (0.0712) 
location_US 0.0887*** 0.0088*** 0.0932*** 0.0072*** 0.0880*** 0.0073** 
 
(0.0169) (0.0027) (0.0147) (0.0008) (0.0295) (0.0028) 
FirstDeg_FrndAdop 0.1843*** 0.2041*** 0.1751*** 0.2587*** 0.1542*** 0.1965*** 
 
(0.0156) (0.0374) (0.0147) (0.0301) (0.0287) (0.0523) 
SecondDeg_FrndAdop 0.0057*** 0.0166*** 0.0105*** 0.0069*** 0.0066*** 0.0115*** 
 




FirstDeg*SecondDeg 0.1091*** 0.1482*** 0.1439*** 0.1827*** 0.0937*** 0.1203*** 
 
(0.0244) (0.0317) (0.0189) (0.0312) (0.0246) (0.0326) 
num_ofFB_friends 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
threshold_percFriendAdop 0.0870 0.0883 0.1898 0.0767 0.1215 0.1025 
 
(0.1242) (0.1223) (0.1187) (0.1054) (0.2342) (0.2217) 
likes_count -0.0098 0.0094 0.0002 0.0001 0.0022 0.0090 
 
(0.0154) (0.0172) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0058) 
fbc_interests 0.0329*** 0.0079*** 0.0214*** 0.0063*** 0.0281*** 0.0073*** 
 
(0.0059) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0070) (0.0022) 
fbc_activities 0.0186 0.0341 0.0354 -0.0191 0.0253 0.0538 
 
(0.0329) (0.0366) (0.0696) (0.0536) (0.0183) (0.0423) 
fbc_tv 0.0065 -0.0130 0.0318 0.0317 0.0116 -0.0128 
 
(0.0229) (0.0255) (0.0435) (0.0335) (0.0078) (0.0094) 
fbc_sports -0.0278 -0.0591 -0.2298*** 0.2143*** -0.0477 -0.0344 
 
(0.0563) (0.0627) (0.0622) (0.0434) (0.1182) (0.0272) 
fbc_movies 0.0289 -0.0121 -0.0804* 0.0264 -0.0094 -0.0024 
 
(0.0260) (0.0289) (0.0420) (0.0294) (0.0083) (0.0081) 
fbc_other 0.0052 -0.0256 -0.0016 -0.0090 -0.0025 -0.0086 
 
(0.0168) (0.0187) (0.0092) (0.0071) (0.0021) (0.0139) 
fbc_music 0.0038*** 0.0242*** 0.0053*** 0.0270*** 0.0045*** 0.0205** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0068) (0.0010) (0.0060) (0.0012) (0.0081) 
fbc_fav_teams 0.0105*** 0.0042*** 0.0160*** 0.0058*** 0.0117*** 0.0047** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0017) 
fbc_fav_athletes 0.0097*** 0.0245*** 0.0170*** 0.0269*** 0.0165* 0.0124*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0083) (0.0097) (0.0035) 
fbc_games 0.0374 -0.0234 0.0932 0.0101 0.0009 -0.0172 
 
(0.0273) (0.0304) (0.1048) (0.0803) (0.0074) (0.0113) 





(0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0035) 
day_lvl_adop -0.0039*** -0.0015*** -0.0027*** -0.0014*** -0.0011* -0.0027*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
frnd_avg_pilot -0.1124 -0.0116 -0.0066 -0.0092 -0.0102 -0.0076 
 
(0.0953) (0.1055) (0.0081) (0.0058) (0.0758) (0.0158) 
frnd_avg_passenger -0.0804 0.0226 -0.0036 0.0015 -0.0412 -0.0221 
 
(0.1012) (0.1120) (0.0083) (0.0055) (0.0634) (0.0672) 
frnd_avg_photo 0.0234 0.0384 0.0145 0.0021 0.0163 0.0265 
 
(0.1431) (0.1203) (0.0157) (0.0053) (0.0244) (0.0312) 
frnd_avg_stories 0.1023 0.0345 -0.0186 -0.0035 0.0617 0.0214 
 
(0.4283) (0.4950) (0.0142) (0.0088) (0.0487) (0.0596) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0458*** 0.0897*** 0.0354*** 0.0269*** 0.0627*** 0.0738***    
 (0.0095) (0.0142) (0.0084) (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0062)    
_cons -0.1701*** 0.0153*** -0.8954*** -0.0803* 0.6550*** 0.0340*** 
 
(0.0122) (0.0037) (0.0682) (0.0411) (0.0656) (0.0040) 
N 8208 8208 275082 275082 787 787 
Notes: This table reports parameter estimates and standard errors of the second stage of the Heckman model as specified in Section 2.4 for App diffusion 
outcomes  (a) Log(Outdegree) and (b) Log(Diameter) for all three samples (1) FanPage ,(2)Top10CC, and (3) Intersection.   


























 source_invited 0.1332*** 0.1015*** 
  (0.0075) (0.0118) 




































































 num_of_FBfriends 0.0000 0.0000* 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) 












 FirstDegFrndAdop 0.2711*** 0.3057*** 
  (0.0451) (0.1035) 
 SecondDegFrndAdop 0.0201** 0.0136*** 
  (0.0077) (0.0019) 




















 N 173050 173050 
 r2 0.3976 0.3318 
Notes: This table reports parameter estimates and standard errors of a two stage least squares model as specified in 
Section 2.5.5. I use Facebook Likes_count as an IV in the first stage to instrument for App Use (ln_total_activity).  
App use is measured at time t whereas diffusion metrics are measured at time t+1, such that the total App activity of 
a user came before the friend’s acceptance of the invitation. 




















Table 2.8 Tradition ads versus Social ads With Friends Liked 
 
Count Friends who Liked No Friends Liked Total 
Before Social Ads 4446 13290 17736 
After Social Ads 6568 (SOCIAL  ADS) 25050 31618 

































































































    
Adoption Source after_friendliked- Social Ad 0.0314*** 0.1275*** 0.0237*** 
 
 
(0.0037) (0.0065) (0.0035) 
 after_nofriendliked- Traditional Ad -0.0100 -0.1251 -0.0221 
 
 
(0.0931) (0.1183) (0.0144) 
 before_nofriendsliked- Traditional Ad -0.0217** -0.0477* -0.0298 
 
 
(0.0081) (0.0262) (0.0239) 
Demographics Controls Female -0.0093*** 0.0412*** 0.0054** 
 
 
(0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0021) 
 location_GB -0.0076 0.0011 -0.0012 
 
 
(0.0078) (0.0135) (0.0072) 
 location_US -0.0031 0.0321** -0.0060 
 
 
(0.0066) (0.0115) (0.0062) 
Network App Controls FirstDeg_Frnd 0.8433*** 0.1143*** 0.0734*** 
  (0.0383) (0.0168) (0.0227) 
 SecDeg_Frnd 0.0237*** 0.0087*** 0.0069*** 
  (0.0025) (0.0009) (0.0005) 
 thresholddaily_percOfFriendsLike 0.2474*** 0.1173*** -0.0569*** 
  (0.0209) (0.0365) (0.0195) 
Facebook Activities 
Controls 
fbc_interests 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0016* 
 
 
(0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0009) 
 fbc_activities -0.0025 0.0128*** -0.0003 
 
 
(0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0015) 
 fbc_television 0.0001 -0.0040* -0.0010 
 
 
(0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0009) 
 fbc_sports 0.0059 -0.0120* 0.0084** 
 
 
(0.0043) (0.0067) (0.0031) 
 fbc_movies -0.0008 -0.0014 0.0013 
 
 
(0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0009) 
 fbc_other 0.0007 -0.0027*** 0.0003 
 
 
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0004) 
 fbc_music 0.0020** -0.0021 -0.0005 
 
 
(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0008) 
 fbc_favoriteTeams 0.0014 -0.0025 0.0032** 
 
 
(0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0012) 
 fbc_favoriteAthletes -0.0012 -0.0026 -0.0014 
 
 




 fbc_games -0.0004 0.0055* 0.0025* 
 
 
(0.0013) (0.0032) (0.0014) 
 fbc_books 0.0021* -0.0028 0.0006 
 
 
(0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0009) 
 likes_count -0.0007 0.0021** -0.0004 
 
 
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0004) 
 num_of_FBfriends -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000 
 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Facebook Privacy 
Controls 
ln_ttl_publicity 0.3169 -0.4957* 0.0213 
 
 
(0.2212) (0.2641) (0.0989) 
Adoption Rate Controls day_lvl_adop -0.0004** -0.0071*** -0.0007*** 
 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Friend App Activity frnd_avg_pilot 0.0098 -0.0068 -0.0035 
 
 
(0.0095) (0.0100) (0.0042) 
 frnd_avg_passenger 0.0033 -0.0031 -0.0003 
 
 
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0011) 
 frnd_avg_photo -0.0494 -0.0827** 0.0126 
 
 
(0.0366) (0.0380) (0.0119) 
 frnd_avg_stories 0.0308 0.0421* -0.0038 
 
 
(0.0198) (0.0216) (0.0071) 
 _cons 0.0221** 0.2364*** 0.0376*** 
 
 
(0.0088) (0.0154) (0.0082) 
 N 49354 49354 49354 
 r2 0.5340 0.1939 0.0407 
Notes: This table reports parameter estimates and standard errors of an ordinary least squares. Dependent variables 
are in logarithmic form.  







































































































 num_of_FBfriends -0.0000** -0.0000 






















 FirstDeg_Frnd 0.0648*** 0.0421*** 
  (0.0212) (0.0116) 
 SecDeg_Frnd 0.0355** 0.0286*** 
  (0.0127) (0.0098) 
Friend App 
Activity Controls 




















 N 49354 49354 
 r2 0.1329 0.1811 
Notes: This table reports parameter estimates and standard errors of a two stage least squares model as specified in 
Section 2.5.5. I use Facebook Likes_count as an IV in the first stage to instrument for App Use (ln_total_activity).  
App use is measured at time t whereas diffusion metrics are measured at time t+1, such that the total App activity of 
a user came before the friend’s acceptance of the invitation. 
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Figure 3.2 Contests in the Crowdsourcing Community 
 
Contest Type Contest Title Contest 
Holder 
Ends Entries Prize 
Open Help 
Community 
Care with a 
new logo 
*** 14mins, 28 
secs 
116 295 
Blind Help Chils 
Play Qid with 
a new logo 





needs a new 
logo 
*** 35mins,  16 
secs 
124 $295 




*** 42 mins, 43 
secs 
73 $395 
Blind Logo redesign 
for 76 year 
old company 
*** 47 mins, 23 
secs 
128 $495 










        PROFILE 
  
Open Contests 
    
   
 
      Activity 
        Contests Held 2 
       Contests Active 1 
       Contests 
Awarded 2 
       Prizes Awarded $595 
       Average 
Feedback 100% 
       
































Figure 3.4 Contest Description 
 
Design Brief 
       For Contest : New Logo for Avaiation Company , Held by : *** , in the logo design community 
Open 
      
Entries Prize 
Contest accepting entries 6 days, 8 hours remaining 
 
20 $600 
         
 
Brief 
Overview We are a new aviation company. 
   
  
Our goal is to provide the premier club for aviation enthusiasts in 
the stage of Texas. 
  
We will be hosting events for owners of aircraft, and also provide a 
complete resource for all kinds of aviation information for the 
state of Texas. 
         
         
 
Brand Name *** 
      




We are targeting Aviation enthusiasts for the state of Texas. Pretty 
much anyone that is interested in flying. 
         
 
Requirements Please include .com in the logo. 
   
  




You are free to be creative on this 
logo. 






















Figure 3.5 Contestants and their Uploads to a Contest 
 






    
           
           
 
 




     
     
     
     
 
#21 [designer x] 
   
#20 [designer y] 
  
#19 [designer z]   
 
 





   
Notes: This figure is adapted from an open innovation marketplace. It shows a few submission entries for a contest 
along with the star rating for each submission. A star is given by the contest holder to a submission. Star ratings are 
out of 5.  For example, submission #21 has a star feedback of 3 out of 5. Submission #20 has a star feedback of 2 out 
of 5, and submission #19 has no star feedback. Designer names are masked. 
 





Figure 3.6 Contestant Profile 
 
Profile for Designer 
X 







Contests Entered 230 






   
   Bio 
  Portfolio by request. 
     





   
 
   
   
   
   
















































































Figure 3.10a Benefits and Drawbacks of Open and Blind Contests for a Contest Holder 
 
Contest Type Benefits Drawbacks 
Open - On average more 
participation. 
- Visible in search engines like 
Google, and thus draws on 
more designers not necessarily 
limited to the community. 
- More derivative work. 
- Everyone can see final logo 
design; less confidential. 
 
Blind - No derivative work – 
contestants cannot see each 
other’s submissions 
- No one can see the final logo 
design ; more confidential 
- Less designer participation 




Figure 3.10b Benefits and Drawbacks of Early Versus Late Submissions for a Contestant 
 
Open Contests With 
Feedback 
Positive Negative 
Early - More likely to receive 
feedback and improve upon 
feedback. 
- Might be able to deter entry 
of others by submitting high 
quality solutions early. 
- More likely to be copied by 
others 
 
Late - More time to work on 
solutions 
- More information in a 
contest- more chances to learn 
from competing submissions. 
- Less likely to be copied by 
others 
- Less likely to receive 
feedback 

















Figure 3.11 Feedback Categorization 
 
(1) Generic Feedback (2) Specific Feedback 
Overall Feedback for all, with no specific 
callouts. 
Specific callout to a submission (Use of 




Hi again everyone, thanks for all the designs. 
The designs are great however many are 
either more masculine or more feminine. The 
primary target is female (they will likely be 
the purchaser of the gifts) however they will 
buy for both males and females. This means 
the logo on the packaging will need to be 
more gender neutral and not too feminine. 
Female buyers might be turned off if they 
think the product looks too girly and not 
suitable for a male. I hope this makes sense 
and helps with your designs. 
Did we lose BigBaldBeard? We liked number 
#305... 
Hi everyone thanks for the designs so far. 
We're looking for something pretty simple 
with more emphasis and refinement on the 
typography. It looks like the device we asked 
for might be a bit difficult to crack so we 
would prefer you concentrate on making the 
typography look simple and premium. If you 
have a great idea for a device/mark by all 
means submit it. Thanks again everyone. 
#82, #68 and #59 are the leading 
designs. #59 is the only contender for the logo 
but it is still not quite perfect. Some additional 
shaping to the G to make it look more smiley 
is desired. I would also like to see the text in 
different colors for $59. For #68 - I love this 
but it needs a body. #82is the most fun body 
because of the attire. His shirt is open and the 
collar is outside of his lapel. He's a bit 
"cooler" and less formal. He is having fun, 
which is important for my character to 
portray. I don't know what the rules are with 
merging designs, but I feel like the purple 
head of #68 is much more elaborate and 
higher quality, so if anything, I would like to 
see that design adopt a better body / 
outfit. #82 really only has the attire correct. 
Everything else is not something I care for too 
much. 
Try put signal strength, globalization, and 
tower within the text of the logo. 
We like #71 #52. But we would like to some 















My name is Abrar Al-Hasan, a PhD student at the University of Maryland College Park. As part 
of my dissertation I am studying the dynamics of online crowdsourcing markets. This survey 
seeks to understand how contest holders make choices in crowdsourcing markets and the factors 
that drive these choices. 
 
This survey can be easily accessed online by clicking on the link below, and it will only take 5 
minutes of your time. To show our appreciation, we will also send you a summary of the survey 






































Figure 3.12b Survey Questions 
 
 
Welcome to the Contest Holder Assessment Survey 
 
Thank you for participating in the survey.   Your response to fill out each question in this survey 
is extremely important. This survey will take approximately 5 minutes to complete. 
 
 










- More than 6 : ____  
 
2- When you launch the contest(s), do you usually have a design in mind or are you looking for 
new ideas from designers? You can choose more than one answer. 
 
- I have a rough idea of the design I want 
- I usually have a fair idea of the design I want  
- I don’t have any prior ideas  
- I am looking for new designs 
- Others (please specify): _______________ 
 
Types of Contests Launched 
 





3b- In your opinion, what advantages do open contests have over blind contests? 
  




4a- If you launched an Open contest(s), did you find that the later submissions are sometimes 
similar to the earlier submissions? 
- Yes 
- No 
                                                 
9





4b- If you launched a Closed contest(s), did you find that the later submissions are sometimes 










5b- How long do you wait before providing feedback to participants (designers) in your contests? 
- I don’t provide feedback 
-     I provide feedback as soon as I see a (potentially) good design 
- I wait for a few days before providing feedback 
-  I wait for a certain number of submissions before providing feedback 
 
5c- Did you give feedback to multiple submissions? If yes, did you provide feedback to  
- I provide feedback only to the best submission. 
- I provide feedback to the top 2 or 3 submissions. 
- I provide feedback to the top 4 or 5 submissions. 
 
5d- The primary purpose of providing feedback to contestants is 
- For better reputation in the [the online design community] community. 
- To suggest improvements to an existing design. 
- To attract more submissions. 
- Others (please specify): _______________ 
 





















































































Profession. Do you design 
logos as a hobby or a main 
source of income?  
How do you choose what contests to 
join? 
Do you have a preference as to when 
you post up your design? (E.g. early 
on the competition, sometime in the 
middle, or right before the 
competition ends).  
318 47 0 Serbia 
Mother by day, designer when 
night falls.Working as a 
freelance on [design community] 
and huge number of clients out 
of [design community].Self-
learned designer. 
I just like it or don't. - When I see a 
contest I may have a vision of what I can 
do in it, or I just skip it if my brain can't 
think of something. Just feel what is good 
for me. 
Sometimes I am the first one. Sometimes 
in the middle, but I don't like to enter at 
the end. I did enter few at the end, but 
prefer beginning and middle. 
145 21 1 Indonesia 
I'm still studying in Gadjah 
Mada University. Designing is 
my hobby and secondary 
profession. It's main source of 
income. When I have more time, 
I sometimes spend it to join 
[design community] contest. 
I usually view more open contests first. If 
I like to join, I join it. I don't like if too 
much participant in a contest. I even don't 
like a logo contests. I prefer to join 
another logo contests. 
When I finished doing my design, I 
submitted it soon. I give the contest 
holder more time to revise my design. 
301 22 3 Philippines 
Graphic Artist. Hobby just to 
augment income. 
I choose a contest that the contest holder 
is actively participating. Meaning that 
he/she gives regular feedback and the way 
the entries are rated truly reflects what 
he/she wants. Most importantly, if the 
contest is also interesting. 
 
No actual preference. It depends on the 
contest and inspiration. I usually join 
early if I have an inspiration for an entry 
or if the contest is very interesting. I 
usually wait for participation from 
others. And then I would wait for a 
rating to happen to see if the CH is 
giving feedback and also to get a better 











[design community] is my sole 
source of self-generated income. 
I look mainly at logo contests of $300 or 
more. From there, I see if the contest title 
and brief are clear and inspire an idea that 
I believe will BENEFIT the CH and help 
him become successful. 
It's rare that I enter a contest the first or 
second day. That usually is a waste of 
time unless the brief is very clear and 
specific. I watch for the amount of 
feedback and participation by the CH to 
understand what he wants better and 




Table 3.1 Variables and Descriptions 
 
 












Contestant skill = (Total number of previous  wins) / (Total 
number of previous contest participation) 
 
c_expertise_dum 
Dummy of whether contestant has more than one design 
Expertise e.g. logo , graphics, website , etc. 
 




Time of contestant's first submission in contest X ,as a 





For contests with Feedback : Maximum star rating of the 




Dummy whether the contestant was given feedback through 
stars or through text. 
Feedback to Others 
Text- Type of 
Feedback 
contest_SpecificFdbk 
For contests with Feedback: Total count of the specific 




For contests with Feedback: Total count of the generic 
feedback given in a contest at time of contestant entry (see 
Figure 3.11). 
Star c_maxstar_prior 




Average star rating given in a contest at time of contestant 
entry to contest. 
 
c_ttlnumuserswithstars_prior 
Total number of users given a star rating at time of contestant 
entry to contest. 
Resubmission c_ttl_resubs Total number of resubmissions of contestant in contest X. 
 
c_timeToResubmit 
The average lag  in number of submissions from one 
submission to next for a contestant in contest X. 
 




Total number of contests user is participating in at time of 
submission in contest X. 
 
c_membershipAge 




contest_entries Total number of entries in contest X. 
 
contest_prize Prize awarded ($) in contest X. 
 




ch_matchesHeld Contest Holder total number of matches held. 
 
ch_matchesPrizes Contest Holder total number of prizes awarded.  
 





Table 3.2a Descriptive Statistics 
Unit Variable Description Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Contestant i       
 c_subOrder First submission time of contestant i. 0.5698 0.3888 0 1 
 c_maxstar Max star rating of contestant i. 1.9656 1.8223 0 5 
 c_won Total number of contests won for  
contestant i. 
13.3417 21.1542 0 352 
 c_experience Total number of contests entered for  
contestant i. 
287.0228 319.4493 2 6043 
 c_skill Contestant i’s skill = Won/Entered. 0.0405 0.0545 0 1 
 c_participating_in Contestant i total number of contests currently 
participating in. 
1.2349 2.3983 0 72 
 c_ttl_resubs Contestant i’s total number of resubmissions. 1.8375 3.2347 0 14 
 c_membershipAge Contestant i’s total number of days in 
community. 
422.0544 612.7567 102 3102 
Contest 
Details 
      
 contest_Entries Total number of Entries in a contest. 211.1656 354.0386 20 4531 
 contest_Designers Total number of Designers in a contest. 69.2919 76.9834 5 1523 
 contest_prize Total USD Prize of Contest. 517.4523 201.9317 100 1945 
 contest_tt_comments Total number of comments in a contest. 10.5048 12.9505 0 145 
 contest_ttldescription_lengt
h 
Count of the total number of words in the design 
description 
223.2715 162.1385 38 1793 
Contest 
Holder 
      
 ch_matchesheld CH -Total number of matches held. 2.8316 3.36956 1 156 
 ch_matchesPrizes CH -Total USD awarded as Prizes. 718.6134 1275.0500 0 32412 
 ch_AvgFdbk Average Feedback of CH. 0.7013 0.3311 0 1 
 ch_Lastseen CH - Number of days last seen. 286.2236 485.7173 0 2103 
 ch_DaysSinceLastFeedback CH - Number of Days since last feedback. 689.4185 478.0628 0 2413 





Table 3.2b Descriptive Statistics of Different Contests 
 
Parameter Open With Feedback 
Mean (stdev) 
Open With No Feedback 
Mean (stdev) 
Blind With Feedback 
Mean (stdev) 
Blind With No Feedback 
Mean (stdev) 
Resubmissions     
         Early 6.2511 (2.9281) 2.5012(0.5101) 4.1231(0.8165) 0.8283(0.3102) 
         Middle 4.3221(3.4010) 0.5129(0.9371) 2.1232(0.5774) 0.1023(0.2938) 
         Late 0.5281(0.8210) 0.2574(0.5023) 0.3984(0.5012) 0.0023(0.0109) 
Skill     
         Early 0.0425(0.04102) 0.0368(0.03483) 0.0432(0.03979) 0.0423(0.04321) 
         Middle 0.0382(0.02307) 0.0375(0.03401) 0.0388(0.03521) 0.0402(0.04117) 
         Late 0.0432(0.03918) 0.0401(0.04032) 0.0415(0.04019) 0.0416(0.04123) 
Experience     
         Early 280.1923(340.3910) 276.3918(376.1920) 289.1920(411.3201) 293.1029(417.1927) 
         Middle 275.1263(382.4263) 273.2837 (401.2371) 295.2736(421.2929) 290.1139(411.2039) 
         Late 293.1249(312.3010) 285.1029(412.1029) 301.2394(370.1820) 292.1298(428.3098) 
Membership Age     
         Early 417.2707(687.1982) 415.2380(632.1028) 434.1039(589.2981) 431.2983(597.4126) 
         Middle 414.1923(662.9247) 409.2938(640.2038) 410.2981(620.1092) 411.2931(610.2986) 
         Late 426.9810(680.1725) 421.2981(664.2081) 438.1029(601.2091) 435.2827(593.1092) 
Contest Details     
Contest Entries 267.4165  (363.9745) 228.5493 (231.5256) 197.3981(221.3382) 151.2983 (215.0192) 
Designers 94.7061    (73.2588 ) 71.7773 (49.2803) 63.4918 (50.2983) 47.1923 (52.3948) 
Prize 520.2096 (290.8650 ) 473.3077 (148.0056) 584.1201   (262.9384) 512.1717 (200.8537) 
Contest Description Length 215.2093 ( 166.2981) 220.1837 (170.2721) 222.3948 (171.2481) 235.2985 (150.2938) 
Contest total comments/Feedback 8.6181 (18.6417) 0 12.39155    (22.2726) 0 












































































 Outcome =  Winning 
Submission 
Strategy 
subOrder & subOrder^2 U-
shaped 
+ - NS Winners capitalize on design visibility and feedback visibility and submit 
late in open contests, whereas it is better to submit early when there is no 
design visibility. When there is neither design nor feedback, there is no 
significant strategic behavior. Supports Proposition 1. 
 Skill*suborder + + - NS Higher skill and later submission, lead to higher probability of winning in 
open contests.  
Feedback to 
Others 
star -  -  Competition. 
 star*subOrder +  -  In open contests, winners capitalize on design visibility and feedback given 
to others and submit later. Whereas in blind contests, users cannot 
capitalize on information spillover as such, thus early submission is best. 




Specific +  -  Open contests:  Winners capitalize on specific feedback (information 
spillover). Whereas in blind contests, specific feedback translates to 
competition. Supports Proposition 2b. 
 Generic NS  +  Generic feedback is more information to everyone and is more beneficial in 
blind contests.  
 subOrder*Specific +  -  Open contests: later submission & more specific leads to more information 
spillover, resulting in higher probability of winning. Blind contests: specific 
feedback is competition. Supports Proposition 2b. 
 subOrder*Generic NS  -  Blind contests, early submission and generic feedback leads to higher 
probability of winning.  
Feedback to 
User 
Feedback to User +  +  Higher feedback leads to higher probability of winning. 
Expertise All measures + + + + Higher skill leads to higher probability of winning 
Resubs ttlResubs + + + NS More resubmissions lead to higher probability of winning. 
 TimetoResubmit - NS - NS Shorter time to resubmit leads to higher probability of winning. 
 Feedbk*TimetoResubmit -  -  Higher feedback and earlier resubmission lead to higher probability of 
winning.  
 ttlResubs*Feedback +  +  Higher total resubmission of users with feedback as opposed to users no 
feedback is positively associated with probability of winning. 














































c_subOrder -0.1223*** -0.1455*** 0.1634*** 0.2176*** -0.2544*** -0.3246*** -0.2321 -0.2551 
 (0.0187) (0.0173) (0.0166) (0.0146) (0.0432) (0.0328) (0.7241) (0.6394) 
c_subOrder^2 0.1667*** 0.1976*** 0.0076*** 0.0084*** -0.0302*** -0.0306*** -0.0864 -0.0869 
 (0.0419) (0.0402) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.6741) (0.6743) 




































c_skill 0.4666*** 0.4959*** 0.4841*** 0.5269*** 0.5066*** 0.5787*** 0.5684*** 0.6188*** 
 
(0.1264) (0.1213) (0.1034) (0.1029) (0.0964) (0.0952) (0.0634) (0.0626) 
c_experience 0.2583*** 0.2921*** 0.2733*** 0.3337*** 0.3361*** 0.3462*** 0.3428*** 0.3530*** 
 
(0.0693) (0.0667) (0.0733) (0.0724) (0.0831) (0.0822) (0.0808) (0.0789) 
c_expertise_dum 0.1159*** 0.1467*** 0.0718*** 0.0727*** 0.1513*** 0.1567*** 0.2113*** 0.2417*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0214) (0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0428) (0.0429) (0.0310) (0.0304) 
c_skill*c_subOrder 0.4953*** 0.5062*** 0.5236*** 0.5429*** -0.2563*** -0.2711*** -0.1650 -0.1652 
 (0.0829) (0.0816) (0.0664) (0.0641) (0.0429) (0.0426) (0.4323) (0.4325) 






 (0.0624) (0.0617) (0.0834) (0.0836) (0.0341) (0.0344) (0.6472) (0.6457) 
c_expertise_dum*c_subOrder 0.2043*** 0.2059*** 0.1302*** 0.1310*** -0.1087*** -0.1092*** -0.0247 -0.0251 
 
(0.0441) (0.0425) (0.0165) (0.0158) (0.0212) (0.0205) (0.7566) (0.7568) 









c_timeToResubmit -0.0134*** -0.0157*** -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0341*** -0.0392*** -0.0342 -0.0347 
 
(0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0532) (0.0543) (0.0074) (0.0071) (0.7213) (0.7215) 









c_ttl_resubs 0.0557*** 0.0533*** 0.0089*** 0.0115*** 0.1043*** 0.1144*** 0.0438 0.0439 
 
(0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0113) (0.0107) (0.0322) (0.0324) 













































































c_participating_in 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0009 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0212) (0.0203) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
contest_entries -0.0005** -0.0008** -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0001** -0.0001** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
contest_prize -0.0026*** -0.0027** -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0019** -0.0019** -0.0010*** -0.0011*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
ch_matchesHeld -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0009 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0021) 
ch_matchesPrizes -0.0401*** -0.0408** -0.0040*** -0.0040*** -0.0000*** -0.0003*** -0.0000*** -0.0002*** 
 
(0.0064) (0.0186) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ch_avgfdbk -0.0000*** -0.0002*** -0.0176*** -0.0172*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0104*** -0.0107*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
c_membershipAge 0.0218*** 0.0241*** 0.0421*** 0.0448*** 0.0545 0.0579 0.0240 0.0253 
 
(0.0057) (0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0112) (0.1152) (0.1143) (0.0845) (0.1153) 
contest_ttldescription_length -0.0112*** -0.0148*** -0.0094*** -0.0109*** -0.0124*** -0.0132*** -0.0127*** -0.0138*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0033) 
_cons 0.1551*** 0.2682*** 0.3151*** 0.3353*** 0.6422*** 0.6249*** 0.4285*** 0.4376*** 
 
(0.0095) (0.0588) (0.0824) (0.0775) (0.1467) (0.1143) (0.1185) (0.1041) 
R-sq between 0.1063 0.1085 0.0141 0.0187 0.0061 0.0083 0.1047 0.1145 
R-sq within 0.1116 0.2101 0.0261 0.0298 0.0115 0.1108 0.1246 0.1358 









N 1630457 1630457 1632492 1632492 477427 477427 152845 152845 
Notes: This table reports parameter estimates and standard errors from the two stage fixed effects and random effects model specified in Section 3.4. The IV used 
for a contestants’ submission order (c_subOrder) is the average submission order in previous periods. The IV used for a contestants feedback (c_maxstars) is the 
average star rating in previous periods. The sample consists of 6091 open contests with feedback, 7134 open contests without feedback, 2417 blind contests with 
feedback, and 1003 blind contests with no feedback. 
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